

Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States¹

TAEHEE WHANG

Texas A&M University

Why do we observe economic sanctions despite strong doubts regarding their effectiveness? While the symbolic use of sanctions is advanced as an alternative to the instrumental use explanation, no one has assessed this alternative explanation empirically. I investigate the symbolic use of sanctions for domestic political gain in the United States, assessing in particular the effect of sanctions imposition on US presidential approval ratings. Findings suggest that policymakers benefit from imposing sanctions through increased domestic support. This domestic political gain can present policymakers with an incentive to use sanctions as a low-cost way of displaying strong leadership during international conflicts.

The central puzzle in debates over the effectiveness of sanctions is the discrepancy between the increasing number of economic sanctions in practice and the increasing pessimism among scholars regarding their effectiveness. The conventional wisdom is that sanctions rarely work as a measure of coercion. However, the frequency of sanctions did not decline in the 1990s despite their increasingly well-documented ineffectiveness: almost one-third of the 170 post-World War I cases in the Institute of International Economics database were launched in the 1990s (Baldwin 1999–2000; Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg 2008). This discrepancy between policymakers' choices and scholars' findings poses a question regarding the effectiveness and use of sanctions. Why do policymakers impose sanctions so frequently even though scholars entertain such strong doubts about their success? As Morgan and Schwebach (1997) famously put it in their title, it seems that "fools suffer gladly." But why?

Considered as a foreign policy tool, sanctions must allow the leader of the sanctioning state to achieve some positive benefit, which sanctions scholars have yet to unravel systematically. Some scholars, especially those who concentrate on a qualitative approach to sanctions, attempt to explain this anomaly in terms of the *symbolic* use of sanctions independent of the instrumental use of sanctions (Galtung 1967; Barber 1979; Daoudi and Dajani 1983; Nincic and Wallenstein 1983; Eland 1995). For example, Eland (1995:31) points out that "In an anarchic world, symbolic goals are important and may even be vital. Nations watch the behavior of other countries carefully for subtle clues about their intentions and resolve." Galtung (1967:412) also explicitly recognizes that "If economic sanctions do not make a receiving nation comply, they may nevertheless serve

¹ *Author's notes:* For comments and suggestions, I thank the editor, anonymous reviewers, Michael Colaresi, Mark Fey, Hein Goemans, Yoram Hafetel, Jeremy Kedziora, Taesuk Lee, Quan Li, Elena McLean, Irfan Nooruddin, Shawn Ramirez, Kyoungwon Seo, Curt Signorino, and Randy Stone. Replication materials will be available at the ISQ website. All errors remain my own.

functions that are useful in the eyes of the sending nation(s)... When military action is impossible for one reason or another, and when doing nothing is seen as tantamount to complicity, then something has to be done to express morality, something that at least serves as a clear signal to everyone that what the receiving nation has done is disapproved of. If the sanctions do not serve instrumental purposes, they can at least have *expressive* functions.”

While the symbolic use of sanctions is advanced as an alternative to the instrumental use explanation, it lacks a rigorous grounding. Most scholars making use of formal or empirical approaches uphold the instrumental view of sanctions’ effectiveness.² The instrumental use explanation focuses on the extent to which the sender’s goals are accomplished as a result of sanctions. An obvious reason for weak interest in the symbolic value of sanctions is that symbolic value is conceptually ad-hoc, hard to generalize, and, therefore, difficult to operationalize. However, the fact that the symbolic value of sanctions is difficult to quantify does not mean that it is meaningless and should be overlooked. Moreover, given the analytic failure to explain the recurrence of seemingly ineffective sanctions, adopting this practical justification for neglecting the symbolic aspect of sanctions prevents scholars from pursuing a potentially fruitful path of research.

Therefore, I present a systematic account of the symbolic function of sanctions. Unfortunately, there is no unified definition of this symbolic function, and scholars often speculate about different types of symbolic impact, further complicating the issue. A primary source of confusion is the inability to specify the membership of the audience at whom the symbolic message of sanctions is aimed. Some argue that the symbolic message of sanctions is primarily aimed at domestic audiences, while others talk about the role of sanctions in signaling values to international audiences. These distinct symbolic uses of sanctions, one for domestic political purposes and the other for international signaling purposes, need to be distinguished analytically because each suggests a different mechanism to explain the initiation and outcome of sanctions. In this paper, I focus on the domestic aspect of symbolic sanctions, by asking how the imposition of sanctions affects the public’s evaluation of a sanctioning leader. I subject the existence of a domestic political benefit of sanctions to an empirical test. The test examines the extent to which symbolic functions can account for the sanctioning policymaker’s incentive to employ sanctions in spite of their lack of results.

Sanctions scholars note both positive and negative links between sanctions and the propensity of the public in the “target” state to rally behind incumbents; research in this area has been both qualitative (Galtung 1967) and empirical (Marinov 2005). From sanctions against Rhodesia in the 1960s, Galtung (1967) shows that the negative effects of sanctions often reinforce political integration in the target state. He argues that, “sending nation(s) not only may fail to achieve their goals, but may even contribute to exactly the opposite of what they hoped for” (Galtung 1967:409). More recently, Marinov (2005:564) offers a counterargument to the rally effect of sanctions and their implications for lengthening the survival of the target state’s leaders, claiming that “economic sanctions work in at least one respect: they destabilize the leaders they target.” However, little attention has been paid to the effects of sanctions on the sanctioning incumbent’s popularity in the “sender” state, compared with the long tradition of research on the relationship between challenging leaders’ approval and their use of force. Given the widespread knowledge of sanctions failures in an instrumental sense, the lack of empirical research on sanctions and public support for sanctioning leaders is rather surprising.

² Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) can be an important exception.

In this paper, my goal is to empirically elaborate the reciprocal link between the tendency to resort to economic sanctions and the popularity of sanctioning incumbents while controlling for endogeneity. I subject this link to two empirical tests and seek to verify whether policymakers have a reason to opt for sanctions in terms of their own political purposes even when favorable outcomes are not likely. Findings suggest that US presidents benefit from sanctions domestically, although sanctions are unlikely to achieve their goals. The initiation of sanctions by itself increases the popularity of presidents. If the imposition of sanctions raises public support for policymakers, and moreover is relatively costless, it stands to reason that sanctions will be an attractive coercive option for those policymakers. This domestic audience benefit can provide policymakers with an important incentive to use sanctions.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the second section, I present the hypothesis for the domestic political use of sanctions. Third, I discuss my research design: two ways to model the reciprocal relationship between presidential popularity and sanctions, followed by the description of the data and variables. Fourth, I discuss the results of the empirical analysis. The fifth section concludes by summarizing the results.

Domestic-Politics Hypotheses

Sanctions can show their symbolic power by satisfying a domestic audience. For a sanctioning leader, they can work as a low-cost display of a foreign policy commitment, which often generates strong domestic support for the incumbent leader. If the domestic political benefit is large enough to offset the cost of sanctions, the instrumental effectiveness of sanctions can become a secondary concern. For example, if a president's opposition of extreme human rights abuses in a target state results in a surge in incumbent popularity, the sanctions' actual subsequent effectiveness in changing the target state's behavior is less likely to radically decrease the support for the incumbent. Although the dictator of the target state may ignore democratic demands and maintain the suppression of civil rights, if the leader of the sender state stands firm on this issue, his "strong" stance may be sufficient to produce an additional domestic political benefit regardless of the effectiveness of sanctions as a coercive measure. Thus, without much regard to the outcome of sanctions, the sanctioning policymaker can avoid the image of an inattentive leader who passively ignores a public that demands attention to an international scene. As Nincic and Wallenstein (1983:8) point out, "following the US ban on imports of Iranian oil in 1980: The [Carter Administration's] decisions [regarding the embargo]... appear to many to be more effective in bolstering the President than in bringing the release of the hostages."

A simple illustration of the sanctioning leader's utility function can clarify this logic. I derive the cost and benefit schedule of the sanctioner from the literature discussing domestic political gains. Suppose a sender state seeks to impose coercive measures in order to change the unacceptable policies of a target state.³ By changing the behavior of the target in the sender's favor, the sender will get a benefit, B , while paying a cost, $-C$, if the target stands firm despite the coercive attempts by the sender. The success or failure of sanctions notwithstanding, we can think of separate cost and benefit terms. First, there can be an independent

³ It is assumed implicitly that the number of possible chances for the use of sanctions is sufficiently large to allow the US president to find a state to sanction. Note that most studies on the diversionary use of force have used the similar war-possibility assumption (James and Hristoulas 1994; Fordham 1998). Moreover, my sanctions sample include both cases in which sanctions are possible and not possible, which makes the results of empirical testing not so obvious. I appreciate one of the anonymous reviewers for the comments.

sunk cost, $-C_k$, that the sender incurs in employing a coercive policy. Of course, this sunk cost will increase if the sender adopts an expensive policy such as military intervention. In almost all cases, sanctions are likely to have lower sunk costs than military intervention. Second, there is an additional benefit term, B_a , independent of winning or losing in the episode. A coercive policy allows the leader of the sender state to announce publicly that she does not acquiesce to the target's objectionable behavior. By cultivating an image of strength, a leader can induce a domestic audience benefit even when the coercive policy fails to bring about the desired policy change in the target state.⁴ In sum, the sender's utility function in choosing any coercive policy—sanctions here—can be described as

$$U(\text{Sanctions}) = P_W(B) + (1 - P_W)(-C) + B_a - C_k,$$

where P_W is the probability of winning in the episode, $B > 0$ is the benefit of winning in the episode, $-C < 0$ is the cost of losing in the episode, $-C_k < 0$ is the sunk cost of the coercive measure, and $B_a > 0$ is the domestic or international audience benefit of employing the coercive measure.

Although this utility illustration assumes that the implementation of sanctions provides the leader of the sender country with positive utility, B_a , independent of the effectiveness of sanctions, whether this audience benefit actually exists remains an open question. If we normalize the utility of staying at Status Quo to zero, the sender will impose sanctions if $U \geq 0$. Suppose an extreme case where the sender is unlikely to achieve concession, that is, $P_W = 0$. Even if $P_W = 0$, the sender still has an incentive to impose sanctions if $U = -C + B_a - C_k \geq 0$. That is, even if the sender expects the sanctions to fail, the sender will be better off by imposing sanctions as long as $B_a \geq C + C_k$. The sanctioning leader will use sanctions if the audience benefit is greater than the total costs that include both the sunk costs and the audience costs of lifting sanctions without obtaining compliance.

A close examination of the sanctions literature concerning the domestic use of sanctions, however, suggests a slightly different utility function. Given the frequent failure of sanctions, it may be realistic to expect that the sender hardly takes the consequence of winning or losing in the episode into consideration, that is, $P_W(B) + (1 - P_W)(-C) \approx 0$. This formulation also implies that the outcome of sanctions may not be a crucial determinant of their imposition. To some degree, the policymakers would acknowledge their inability to extract political concessions immediately, that is, $P_W \approx 0$. Moreover, even if the sender does not expect any concession, the cost of ineffective sanctions may be negligible to the sender, that is, $P_W \approx 0$ but $-C \approx 0$. Smith (1995: 229), in his formal study, assumes that the cost of sanctions can even be positive due to their domestic effects: "Sanctions have both political and economic costs.... Although economically costly, sanctions are often domestically popular. In these circumstances, nations may actually benefit from symbolic sanctions." Consequently, the sender makes a decision mostly in terms of domestic politics, B_a and sunk costs, $-C_k$, as $U(\text{Sanctions})$ is modified such that the sender has less interest in the outcome of the sanctions than in their domestic effect.

Moreover, in reality, while there is a wide range of sanctions, the sunk costs of economic coercion are in general lower than the costs associated with most other options. Baldwin (1999–2000:84) highlights the variation in the cost of available policy options, arguing that, "In assessments of sanctions as tools of foreign policy, the costs of using sanctions often receive little or no attention."

⁴ Moreover, it is possible that this benefit term can have a reputational aspect that can apply to an international audience, demonstrating that the sender will not tolerate the target's misdeeds. Not only can the target state learn the sender's true intentions from the coercive policy, but also other states can be deterred from adopting similar policies.

His “logic of choice” suggests that the frequent use of sanctions, despite their ineffectiveness, results from the lower cost of sanctions as compared to military measures.⁵ For example, if we define the cost of sanctions as the sum of the sender’s presanction exports to the target and imports from the target, the sender’s cost is much less than 1% of her Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in most cases. Moreover, in many cases, the sunk costs are zero when sanctions are imposed in the form of economic or military aid suspensions.⁶ Finally, while the sunk costs would be largely diffused to the domestic populace,⁷ the audience benefit is concentrated on the sender’s leader. With the relatively minimal sunk costs, that is, $-C_k \approx 0$, the original utility function is reduced to

$$U_1(\text{Sanctions}) = B_a.$$

Therefore, what needs to be examined is the existence of domestic audience benefits, B_a , assuming that the sunk costs of sanctions are low enough to make sanctions profitable. If B_a exists, the leader of the sender state has an incentive to use sanctions because (i) the outcome of sanctions rarely matters, and hence is irrelevant (that is, $P_W(B) + (1 - P_W)(-C) \approx 0$); (ii) the sunk cost of sanctions is negligible (that is, $-C_k \approx 0$); and (iii) there is an independent benefit of imposing sanctions (that is, $B_a > 0$), which makes the sender prefer sanctions to doing nothing. Finally, I construct the domestic-politics hypothesis based on the utility function $U_1(\text{Sanctions}) = B_a$.

Domestic-Politics Hypothesis: *A domestic audience benefit exists in sanctioning. The popularity of the sender’s leader increases as the unacceptable policy of the target state is responded to by the imposition of economic sanctions.*

Research Design

The Domestic-Politics Hypothesis requires us to investigate the existence of audience benefits, B_a , to the incumbent of the sanctioning state. As a proxy for the domestic political benefit, B_a , I analyze the effect of imposing sanctions on US presidential approval ratings. If the initiation of sanctions increases the approval rating of the sender’s incumbent, controlling for other variables that have been studied as important determinants of presidential approval, we can argue that the imposition of sanctions has a positive value to the sender’s leader. Assuming that the survival of the leader depends on election outcomes, sanctions become a viable policy option that is relatively costless and yet effective in terms of achieving a domestic popularity boost.

One may ask whether presidential approval rating is a valid measure of domestic audience benefit. Importantly, what if sanctions are not initiated by presidents,

⁵ While diplomatic pressure is even less expensive than sanctions, the existence of positive B_a is sufficient to make sanctions a better option.

⁶ A recent development of sanctions literature that emphasizes targeted or smart sanctions (Biersteker 2004; Lopez and Cortright 2004) finds additional supporting evidence for declining sunk costs of sanctions. Policymakers have an incentive to pay attention to these sanctions since they focus on “the system more narrowly, blocking weapons and military supplies without preventing civilian trade” (Lopez and Cortright 2004:100), and thus resolve the normative controversy regarding their humanitarian costs. Because these sanctions are imposed not against innocent consumers or producers in the target country but against selected sectors (for example, trade ban on military goods), the likelihood of all-out economic restrictions, where the sunk costs of sanctions can be high, should decline. Consequently, we expect the sunk costs of smart sanctions to be lower than in the case of other comprehensive sanctions.

⁷ We can think of another important domestic audience: business interest groups. Because sanctions disrupt extant trade relationship between the sender and target, the economic sectors affected negatively by sanctions would have an incentive to oppose them. When the cost of sanctions is concentrated on certain business groups, they can mobilize the pressure to stop sanctions more effectively than general constituency (Olson 1965). Thus, in theory, this would certainly affect C_k from the perspective of a sanctioning leader. While this public choice approach (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988) can work as another source of domestic use of sanctions, in this paper, I focus on the public support from general populace.

but by the Congress? My short answer is that (i) it is justifiable in theory to focus on presidential popularity, and (ii) my main finding of a positive relationship between imposing sanctions and domestic political gains remains robust even when a distinction is made between sanctions initiated by the executive branch and those initiated by the legislative branch (that is, the finding stays the same when the sanctions variable is transformed, such that the legislative sanctions are excluded from the analysis).

At a general level, although there have been ups and downs in terms of Congressional influence on foreign policymaking at critical historical junctures, the US Congress in general plays a relatively weak role in foreign policy. Two main reasons stand out. In the first place, US presidents have been perceived as accountable for foreign affairs, especially in security-related areas. In the eyes of the public, it is the president who steers US foreign policy, as seen from referring to foreign policy positions by using a president's name, such as with the "Obama Doctrine." This framing assigns some kind of ownership to a president for a certain foreign policy, and underscores that the identity of the president is a critical factor in explaining how foreign policies are created, maintained, and changed. Second, the Congress is institutionally disadvantaged compared with presidents in relation to foreign policymaking that often requires fast decision making and efficient bargaining skills. Given its large membership and the fact that they hold a wide range of preferences regarding economic policy, it is not surprising that Congress is rarely united enough to take the initiative in foreign affairs with a unified voice. Second, most bills passed by Congress tend to leave a lot of room for presidents to maneuver. When a president has a reason for exempting a particular target country from some type of punishment, for example, this presidential agenda can easily override the Congress's decision to take coercive actions. These weaknesses of the US Congress—vis-a-vis taking the initiative on foreign policy and enacting foreign policy-relevant legislation—apply to the case of economic sanctions. While I did not distinguish different types of foreign policies, sanctions are clearly one of them, whether they take the form of a complete embargo, trade restrictions, or termination of economic and military aid. When it comes to coercive tools that the United States can utilize, sanctions include all possible foreign policy options except simple diplomatic threats and the use of force.

Finally, an important reality is that sanctions are much less costly and aggressive than military operations. In theory, Congress can be more inclined to tie the hands of the executive branch when it wishes to take aggressive military action in foreign affairs than when it seeks to use sanctions or diplomatic threats. Since sanctions are not as costly as military operations, sanctions may not provide the Congress with a strong incentive to act. Given that the Congress has not been able to affect foreign policy in general, we can expect that the lack of Congressional influence will be even more pronounced in the case of sanctions. Of course, the other side of the argument also seems plausible. While Congress may lack incentives to challenge presidential dominance of sanctions policy, the relative cheapness of sanctions may lead Congress to use sanctions frequently. However, Congress seems to have another constraint here, too. By definition, sanctions are a politically motivated action to disrupt the normal flow of economic resources, and this interference with normal economic activity often gives rise to opposition from a variety of interest groups. Congressional members tend to be more sensitive than presidents to the opposition of individual interest groups, given that presidents depend on a broader electoral base. Thus, we can expect that the frequency of legislative sanctions is not going to rise significantly just because sanctions are a relatively low-cost option. Sanctions are cheap, but they will not always be cheap for Congress as a whole. Consequently, I think that

it makes sense to model the presidents as a main initiator of economic sanctions and to focus on their audience benefit term.⁸

To explore the reciprocal relationship between American presidential approval ratings and sanctions initiation, it is important to take the endogeneity problem into account. The endogeneity problem results from the possible reverse causal effects of approval rating on sanctions decisions. For instance, while triggering sanctions can affect the policymaker's popularity as hypothesized, it is also plausible that policymakers suffering from a low approval rating may lean toward sanctions. Policymakers can also opt for sanctions when they are in a secure position or expect a rise in public support. If the domestic support for policymakers has a direct impact on the decision to launch sanctions, then assuming a causal effect of sanctions initiation on approval ratings will introduce a potential threat to validity because variation in the exogenous variable, sanctions initiation, is attributed to variation in the endogenous variable, approval ratings.

With this in mind, I offer two empirical models to test the Domestic-Politics Hypothesis, where the difference between the two models lies in the ways that the sender state's leader uses opinion survey results when deciding whether or not to engage in sanctions. These models are substantively distinct in that the link between sanctions imposition and presidential approval is posited as either sequential or simultaneous.

Sequential or Backward-Looking Process

The first model assumes a sequential process wherein presidents make a sanction decision based on the "past" levels of, or changes in, public support. Because the sender state's leader applies economic penalties depending on the history of his public support, the way in which the sender's leader uses opinion poll results can be called "backward-looking." The model is specified as follows: both the level and change in the approval rating at the period $t-2$ affect the imposition

⁸ Another validity question should be addressed: Why do I use overall presidential performance when sanctions are associated with foreign policy, which is just one part of what voters are weighing when they express an overall judgment? My short answer is that despite the broadness of general approval rating in terms of its underlying causal mechanisms, the use of general presidential approval is theoretically meaningful and empirically reliable, compared with the use of foreign policy approval or compared with specific segment of general presidential approval. First, theoretically, the changes in the overall standing of the US presidents seem to be a valid measure for the domestic audience benefits. The positive aspects of utility in imposing sanctions—based on public awareness that the president is doing something—have been missing in the cost-benefit equation of the president. American presidents and other actors in domestic politics, including the public, who may or may not be aware of the details of foreign affairs, do pay attention to the overall president's job approval. That is, the public is more sensitive to the president's overall standing as a key indicator of presidential competence than to his performance in specific policy domains. From the perspective of presidents, this should be an important piece of information, and presidents in general have good reason to pay attention to their overall popularity scores. When we ask what components are likely to constitute the utility of a president in deciding whether or not to impose sanctions, one of the components should be general popularity among likely voters. This reasoning is partly confirmed by the fact that overall presidential popularity is widely used in a number of International Relations (IR) studies that connect public opinion and the propensity to use force (Mueller 1973; Kernell 1978; MacKuen 1983; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Ostrom and Job 1986; Fordham 1998). Second, recent studies have demonstrated that the public's assessment of the president's foreign policy performance play a causal role in shaping the president's general job performance. Thus, it is possible to argue that the general approval rating not only represents domestic audience benefits theoretically, but also includes in it the effect of foreign policy evaluation, which can justify my focus on the general approval rating as the ultimate score sheet of the president. Nincic and Hinckley (1991) note, "an isolated action or event may serve as a core around which a configuration of perceptions is formed and more general impressions are built. Hence, general evaluations of [presidential] candidates, known to explain the vote, may be shaped by these more specific perceptions." Other studies confirm the results of Nincic and Hinckley (1991) in relation to different econometric methods and time periods (Nickelsburg and Norpoth 2000; Cohen 2002; Mcavoy 2006). Finally, in view of an empirical analyst, a practical issue can be raised that the general approval rating has been collected on a monthly basis for a long time, whereas the foreign policy approval survey was conducted only sporadically. The reliable data can be constructed on a quarterly basis from the foreign policy survey. Although this data issue may appear to be a minor point, we can make more accurate inferences with more fine-grained data, that is, overall approval rating.

of sanctions at the period $t-1$, which in turn has an impact on the change in the approval rate of the current period t . I take two equations connecting the approval rating and sanctions initiation into consideration at the same time. The primary method to assess the effect of sanctions imposition on the approval ratings is a normal-linear model, while a second equation analyzes the determinants of sanctions initiation using probit.⁹ I form a joint distribution involving two sequentially related processes: the sanctions initiation (probit) and the approval rating dynamic (normal-linear). Then, I estimate the parameters of both equations by maximizing the following joint log-likelihood function that consists of the product of probit and normal-linear likelihood functions. The log-likelihood function is then as follows:

$$\ln L = \sum_{i=1}^N \left[y_{S_i} \ln(\Phi(z_i\gamma)) + [(1-y)S_i](1 - \ln[(\Phi(z_i\gamma))]) - \frac{1}{2} \ln(2\sigma^2) - \frac{1}{2\sigma^2} (y_{A_i} - x_i\beta) \right]$$

where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In the sanctions initiation equation (probit part), Y_{S_i} , z_i , and γ denote dependent variables, independent variables, and coefficients. In the approval rating equation (normal-linear part), Y_{A_i} , x_i , and β denote the dependent variables, independent variables, and coefficients, respectively. This log-likelihood function is maximized with respect to γ and β .¹⁰

Simultaneous or Forward-Looking Process

The second model assumes a simultaneous process wherein the expectation of “future” approval ratings can play a role in expediting the imposition of sanctions. That is, sanctions at the current period t affect the approval rating at the next period $t+1$ or the difference between next and current rating. At the same time, the expectation of future rating at the next period $t+1$ affects the sanctions decision of current period, t . Unlike the first model, sanctions are decided based on how much the popularity of the US president is expected to shift in the future. Thus, we can say that the leaders of sender states pursue a “forward-looking” strategy when they consider economic coercion conditional on their popularity. For this analysis, I use a two-stage probit least squares (2SPLS) model where sanctions decisions and future expectation of approval ratings are simultaneously associated with each other.¹¹

The data consist of 624 US presidential monthly approval rates ranging from January 1948 to December 1999. The dependent variable for the normal-linear or OLS part is the monthly difference of the US presidential approval rating, $D_Approval$, while the dependent variable for the probit part is a dummy variable that indicates the sanctions’ imposition, $Sanct_init$. These variables are also used as principal explanatory variables in the other equations.

Approval is the percentage of survey respondents who approve of the performance of the president. The source of the data is Gallup polls, which ask if

⁹ The normal-linear part represents simply the maximum likelihood estimation of the multivariate linear regression model. To check whether the normal-linear model is appropriate, I conduct two tests for non-spherical errors. The plot of error terms across time indicates no systematic pattern. Moreover, Durbin-Watson statistics for all different specifications are close to two.

¹⁰ I use R for this analysis.

¹¹ The 2SPLS model is analogous to a two-stage least squares model except that one of the endogenous variables, sanctions initiation, is dichotomous. A probit method is used instead of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for that equation where the initiation of sanctions is an endogenous variable. Two steps are involved in the estimation. In the first stage, I estimate two reduced form equations, one OLS and the other probit, using all the exogenous variables. The second stage estimates the structural form equations where the predicted values of the reduced form equations are included as main explanatory variables. Finally, the standard errors of the second stage are corrected to eliminate bias. For this analysis, I use `cdsimeq` command in STATA 9.

TABLE 1. US Presidential Approval Rating and Sanctions Initiations

<i>Summary statistics</i>						<i>Number of sanctions</i>						
President	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min	Max	0	1	2	3	5	7	Total
Truman	60	39.70	11.89	23	69	57	2	1	0	0	0	4
Eisenhower	96	64.96	7.00	49.5	79	89	5	2	0	0	0	9
Kennedy	35	70.29	7.21	56	80.5	30	3	2	0	0	0	7
Johnson	61	55.57	13.10	35	76.5	55	5	1	0	0	0	7
Nixon	68	50.52	11.85	24	67	59	9	0	0	0	0	9
Ford	28	46.73	4.93	37.5	58	20	7	0	0	0	1	14
Carter	48	46.00	11.93	28.67	72.33	24	15	7	1	1	0	37
Reagan	96	52.85	7.41	36.33	68	66	24	5	1	0	0	37
Bush	48	60.48	14.32	30.5	84.75	31	14	2	1	0	0	21
Clinton	84	54.41	7.20	40.67	67	63	19	2	0	0	0	23
Total	624	54.43	12.77	23	84.75	494	103	22	3	1	1	168

(Notes. The left group of columns shows the summary statistics for US presidential approval ratings, while the right group of columns shows the number of sanctions initiated in one month. For example, Ford imposed sanctions in eight months of his twenty-eight month term. During the eight months of the sanctions use, Ford initiated one sanction per month for seven of eight months, but imposed seven sanctions in the remaining month.)

respondents approve of the way the president is handling his job.¹² This variable has a mean 54.43 with a standard deviation of 12.77. Despite the stability of the US political system, successive presidents have experienced widely varying levels of approval. As Table 1 shows, the mean approval level of Kennedy is 70.29%, while Ford has only 46.73%. *D_Approval* denotes a difference variable of *Approval*; Positive values indicate the amount of increase in approval rate, compared with the previous month. *D_Approval* has a mean 0.019 and a standard deviation 4.31.

Sanct_init measures the number of sanctions imposed in a month. I rely on Hufbauer et al. (2008) and Drury (2001) for my sanctions observations. Table 1 displays the number of sanctions imposed in each month for all US presidents. Carter and Reagan initiated sanctions most frequently (37 times during their terms), and the frequency of sanctions did not decline over time. *Sanct_init* has a mean 0.20 with a standard deviation of 0.40. In the normal-linear or OLS part, I expect a positive association between *Sanct_init* and *D_Approval*, implying that the use of sanctions is beneficial to the sender's leader.

I select the independent variables that have been used in earlier studies of approval ratings and the use of sanctions. Besides the main regressors, that is, the lagged *Sanct_init* for the normal-linear or OLS part, and the lagged *Approval* and *D_Approval* for the probit part, I include the following economic (*Inflation*, *Unemployment*), political (*Inauguration*, *Crisis_init*, *Elec_prox*, *Prior_opinion*), and time-control variables that affect approval rating difference and the probability of sanctions initiation. See Appendix for the detailed description of independent variables.

¹² I obtained the approval rating file directly from the representative at Gallup through my university data service. Several points are notable. First, for some polls that were conducted several times per month, I calculated the average approval rating. Second, for some cases where polls were conducted that continued past the end of one month and a couple of days into the next month, I took the poll result for the earlier month. Third, when Gallup missed surveys for some months, I used interpolation by taking the mean approval of those months. Finally, the number of surveys per month increases as time goes on. This trend will affect the accuracy of approval data because a single monthly survey result will in principle be less accurate than the averaged result that is based on multiple surveys in one month. As temporal distance between units of observations increases, for example, from month to quarter, the loss of accuracy will increase. I think that the loss of accuracy is reduced in my case because the temporal distance is close, that is, it is calculated on a monthly basis.

Data Analysis

I first show the estimation result of Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with bootstrapped confidence intervals, which examines the sequential or backward-looking relationship between US presidential approval ratings and sanctions initiation. As explained earlier, I maximize the joint log-likelihood function with respect to the coefficients where the probit part of the log-likelihood represents the initiation of sanctions and the normal-linear part models the change in presidential approval rating. I use bootstrapping techniques to find coefficients and standard errors: I draw a sample with replacement from the original data set where the number of observations is the same as the original data set. Then, I run MLE with specifications as described earlier. I repeat the resampling and MLE for 1,000 times, which produces 1,000 sets of coefficients, and then I calculate the mean values and confidence intervals for each coefficient. To interpret the bootstrapped results, a coefficient is statistically significant if the corresponding bootstrap confidence interval does not include zero.

I concentrate on the interpretation of the normal-linear results, to which the hypothesis is directly related. Table 2 shows strong support for the Domestic-Politics Hypothesis. A positive and significant coefficient of $Sanct_init_{t-1}$ demonstrates that the public tends to support the incumbent president when the president responds to the misdeeds of the target state by launching sanctions. On average, the initiation of sanctions is followed by a 1.203% increase in presidential

TABLE 2. Estimation Result for MLE With Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals (CI)

Variable	Est	90% CI	95% CI	99% CI
Normal-linear: approval rating difference				
Constant	3.439***	(2.355, 4.274)	(2.133, 4.494)	(1.455, 4.872)
$Sanct_init_{t-1}$	1.203***	(0.664, 1.786)	(0.553, 1.891)	(0.369, 2.078)
Inflation	-1.738***	(-2.483, -1.035)	(-2.611, -0.890)	(-2.831, -0.576)
Unemployment	-0.996**	(-1.766, -0.225)	(-1.907, -0.056)	(-2.161, 0.188)
Inauguration	6.304***	(5.143, 7.315)	(4.808, 7.666)	(4.069, 8.058)
Crisis init	4.016***	(2.976, 4.939)	(2.614, 5.139)	(1.948, 5.662)
Elec prox	0.053	(-0.003, 0.109)	(-0.017, 0.118)	(-0.041, 0.135)
Prior opinion	-0.080***	(-0.098, -0.061)	(-0.100, -0.057)	(-0.108, -0.051)
Year1	0.202	(-0.379, 0.765)	(-0.477, 0.899)	(-0.650, 1.135)
Year2	0.457	(-0.190, 1.104)	(-0.361, 1.292)	(-0.670, 1.562)
Year4	1.125**	(0.436, 1.945)	(0.317, 2.119)	(-0.042, 2.374)
Probit: sanctions initiation				
Constant	-0.274	(-1.138, 0.642)	(-1.492, 0.939)	(-2.070, 1.366)
$Approval_{t-2}$	-0.012*	(-0.023, -0.001)	(-0.026, 0.001)	(-0.034, 0.009)
$D_Approval_{t-2}$	0.001	(-0.026, 0.026)	(-0.031, 0.029)	(-0.042, 0.038)
Unemployment	0.312	(-0.452, 1.048)	(-0.674, 1.249)	(-0.872, 1.438)
Inflation	0.333	(-0.125, 0.788)	(-0.222, 0.916)	(-0.478, 1.184)
Elec prox	-0.004	(-0.022, 0.012)	(-0.024, 0.016)	(-0.030, 0.022)
Tcounter	0.004	(-0.033, 0.045)	(-0.044, 0.054)	(-0.058, 0.076)
Tcounter sqd	-0.0001	(-0.001, 0.001)	(-0.001, 0.001)	(-0.002, 0.001)
N = 624				
Log-likelihood = -5,442.423				
$\chi^2 = 1,296.536***$				

(Notes. The table displays the results of MLE—sequential or backward-looking relationship between US presidential approval ratings and sanctions initiation. The dependent variable of normal-linear is the monthly difference of US presidential approval rating, that is, $D_Approval_t = Approval_t - Approval_{t-1}$, while the dependent variable of the probit is the initiation of sanctions, that is, $Sanct_init_{t-1}$. All the regressors are appropriately lagged in order to characterize the sequential relationship between the approval rating and the decision to initiate sanctions. ***zero not included in 99% CI, ** zero not included in 95% CI, and * zero not included in 90% CI.)

approval ratings in the next month.¹³ Holding all other variables at their mean values, this 1.203% gain in approval, on average, shifts the estimated change in presidential rating from -0.831% to 0.372%. Given that the pooled average level of approval rate is 54.43%, imposing one sanction moves the rating from slightly below average (53.599%) to above average (54.802%). While it is not a big jump compared with a 4.016% increase in the case of involvement in more serious crises, the result suffices to show the existence of a domestic audience benefit effect from sanctions.

Most economic and political variables also show expected signs with statistical significance. High *Unemployment* and *Inflation* produce significant and negative impacts on the approval rating difference in the next month. The political variables exhibit strong associations with the approval rating. On average, the initiation of foreign conflicts that use more extreme coercive measures than sanctions tends to increase the approval rating by 4.016%, which is consistent with what existing studies predict regarding the use of force and public support for presidents. A president's inauguration turns out to be statistically significant, raising the approval rating by 6.304%. However, *Elec_prox* fails to show statistical significance in both equations.¹⁴ The negative and significant coefficient of *Prior_opinion* implies that the public opinion exhibits very strong inertia in the sense that approvers and non-approvers are likely to remain the same.¹⁵ The U-shaped pattern holds at best only partially as the positive and significant coefficient of *Year4* indicates. However, *Year1* and *Year2* are insignificant and have a reversed sign. The results of the probit equation suggest that presidential popularity has a weak impact on the decision to launch sanctions. While the monthly change in the approval rating, $D_Approval_{t-2}$, is statistically insignificant, $Approval_{t-2}$ shows a negative association with the initiation of sanctions at 10% significance level. This implies that presidents tend to use sanctions when they suffer from a low approval rating. Other domestic political and economic variables have statistically insignificant effects. *Tcounter* and *Tcounter_sqd*, the two variables used to represent temporal dependence, also turn out to be insignificant. I report the χ^2 statistic in Table 2, which tests if the model presented here significantly improves the model fit relative to the restricted model, where all the coefficients are set to zero. The χ^2 statistic shows that my model fits the data significantly better than the simpler model.

I now shift attention to the alternative test that assumes that the symbolic impact of sanctions at the national level is connected to the fact that policymakers are forward-looking. The statistical results presented in Table 3 indicate that in this forward-looking setup, the initiation of sanctions tends to improve future public opinion regarding the incumbent leader's job performance. On average, the imposition of sanctions tends to result in a 3.301% increase in the approval rating in the following month. Holding all other variables at their average values, the estimated positive effect of sanctions, 3.301%, shifts the estimated changed in approval rating from 2.034% to 5.335%. Taken together with the previous result regarding the sequential link, both backward-looking and forward-looking

¹³ I perform robustness checks for my empirical results by eliminating these legislative sanctions from my *Sanct_init* variable. Based on a recent data collection project, Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES), I change the value of *Sanct_init* from one to zero if sanctions are imposed by the legislature. More specifically, I select the US sanctions cases in the TIES data where the *sanctionidentity* and *othersanctionidentity* variables have the value of two, which denote legislative sanctions. While I do not report the results here due to page limit, my findings in both sequential and simultaneous settings remain almost identical even when I take the legislative sanctions into account.

¹⁴ While I also tried variables such as divided government or legislative share of government party, neither variable gained statistical significance.

¹⁵ As a robustness check, I tried a lagged dependent variable as a regressor, but the main result remained unchanged.

TABLE 3. Estimation Result for Two-Stage Probit Least Squares (2SPLS) Model

Variable	OLS: approval rating difference				Probit: sanctions initiation			
	Reduced form		Structural form		Reduced form		Structural form	
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Est	SE	Est	SE	Est	SE	Est	SE
<i>Sanct_init_{t-1}</i>			3.301***	1.135				
<i>D_Approval_t</i>							0.116**	0.050
<i>Inflation</i>	-1.122**	0.473	-2.764***	0.805	0.484***	0.172	0.572***	0.186
<i>Unemployment</i>	-0.986	0.731	-1.637	1.096	0.203	0.263	0.302	0.271
<i>Inauguration</i>	6.892***	1.516	5.566***	2.028	0.683	0.549		
<i>Crisis_init</i>	3.330***	0.962	3.198**	1.414	0.067	0.344		
<i>Elec_prox</i>	0.107***	0.035	0.095*	0.049	0.005	0.012	-0.002	0.009
<i>Prior_opinion</i>	-0.096**	0.040	-0.048**	0.023	-0.016	0.014		
<i>Year1</i>	5.780***	1.387	0.467	0.698	1.626***	0.502		
<i>Year2</i>	4.090***	0.918	1.296	0.862	0.648***	0.322		
<i>Year4</i>	-2.303**	0.983	1.760**	0.877	-0.561	0.349		
<i>Approval_{t-2}</i>	0.029	0.040			0.011	0.014	0.003	0.006
<i>Tcounter</i>	0.143	0.104			0.102***	0.039	0.028	0.019
<i>Tcounter_sqd</i>	0.003	0.002			-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.000
<i>Constant</i>	-4.721*	2.430	4.262***	1.518	-3.105***	0.898	-1.420***	0.482
<i>N</i>	624		624		624		624	
R-squared	0.14		0.12					
Log-likelihood					-301.70		-305.90	

(Notes. The table displays the results of 2SPLS—the simultaneous or forward-looking relationship between US presidential approval rating and sanctions initiation. The dependent variable of OLS is the monthly difference of US presidential approval rating, that is, $D_Approval_t = Approval_t - Approval_{t-1}$, while the dependent variable of the probit is the initiation of sanctions, that is, $Sanct_init_{t-1}$. All the regressors are appropriately lagged. Standard errors are corrected following Maddala (1983). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$)

models show strong support for the Domestic-Politics Hypothesis: whether the US presidents are backward-looking or forward-looking when they consider the ways in which their job approval ratings affect their decision to initiate economic coercion, the US public is likely to reward an incumbent president for the use of sanctions as an appropriate measure of coercion when the target state behaves unacceptably. All findings confirm the existence of the B_a term: this domestic political gain presents policymakers with strong motivation to engage in sanctioning activities even if they are instrumentally ineffective.

The other structural form equation (Model 4) shows that the prospect of getting a higher approval rating has a significant impact on initiating sanctions. I find a positive and significant effect of expectations regarding a future approval rating increase on the president's decision to use sanctions. Note that in the earlier sequential model (Table 2), while the change in approval ratings was statistically insignificant, the level of approval rates showed a negative and significant association with the initiation of sanctions. On the other hand, the simultaneous model shows that the expectation of future change in approval ratings has a positive impact on initiating sanctions. Both findings imply that US presidents are more likely to use economic coercion (1) when they were previously in a bad position in terms of public approval and (2) when they anticipate that their job approval will rise in the future.

Table 3 also indicates that the sign and statistical significance of coefficients of other exogenous regressors are consistent with those of the sequential model in Table 2. First, *Inflation* is negatively and significantly associated with approval rates (Model 2). The coefficient of *Inflation* is significantly positive in the probit

part (Model 4), indicating that domestic economic hardship increases the probability that sanctions will be imposed. However, *Unemployment* turns out to be insignificant in the simultaneous analysis. Second, all the political variables, *Inauguration*, *Crisis_init*, *Elec_prox*, and *Prior_opinion*, are significant in both reduced (Model 1) and structural (Model 2) form equations. In Model 2 that controls for the endogenous risk of imposing sanctions, the public support for the president increases significantly when a new president takes office, when more serious coercive measures than sanctions are adopted, or when an election gets closer—on average by 5.566%, 3.198%, and 0.095% respectively. Prior approval also serves as a baseline for later evaluations, as indicated by the small and negative coefficient. These results are consistent with those of the sequential model with the exception that in the sequential model *Elec_prox* fails to be significant. Among year variables, only *Year4* passes the test of statistical significance once the instrument of sanctions initiation is included in the structural equation (Model 2), whereas both *Tcounter* and *Tcounter_sqd* are not significantly related with a propensity to initiate sanctions (Model 4).

Conclusion

The evidence of past years shows that sanctions mostly fail to extract political concessions from target states. Given this lack of instrumental success, what explains the frequent use of economic sanctions? In this paper, I offer support for an answer to this puzzle: sanctions have a symbolic dimension and are used for domestic political purposes. Policymakers and scholars have known for a long time that sanctions can and usually do serve both instrumental and symbolic purposes. While the symbolic uses of sanctions are widely thought of as alternative explanations to the possible instrumental value of sanctions, little attention had been paid to the empirical evaluation of these claims. Now, I have empirically evaluated the extent to which the symbolic accounts of sanctions fit with reality. Between the two different symbolic effects of sanctioning—one at the international level and the other at the domestic audience level—I focused on the symbolic value of sanctions at the domestic level. To subject this symbolic effect on the home front to an empirical test, I assessed the effect of sanctions imposition on US presidential approval ratings from 1948 to 1999 while controlling for endogeneity. My empirical results suggest that policymakers reliably benefit from sanctions because imposing sanctions increases public support. Even when instrumentally ineffective, sanctions are an efficient way of displaying “do something” leadership to the public in the midst of international conflict. Sanctions can be used to placate the domestic populace when few other options that cost as little are available, and elevate the popularity of incumbent leaders.

Appendix 1: Independent Variables

Inflation: One-month change in the consumer price index. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; the US Consumer Price Index for all items for all urban consumers (CUUR0000SA0); <http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu>. (Mean 0.31; Standard Deviation (SD) 0.37).

Unemployment: One-month change in the national unemployment rate. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; the US unemployment rate for the civilian labor force (LNS14000000); Seasonally adjusted; <http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?ln>. (Mean 0.0009; SD 0.22).

Inauguration: A dummy variable that takes the value of one for the first month that survey was taken once a new president takes office and zero otherwise. *Inauguration* picks up the first month of the presidential period for all presidents.

Crisis_init: A dummy variable that measures the initiation of an international crisis that is more severe than economic threats. Source: International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set. I use the break variable in the ICB, which identifies the initiator and the level of the initiation. I code *Crisis_init* as one if $\text{break} \geq 3$ and zero otherwise, where $\text{break} < 3$ means less intensive coercive options such as verbal, political, and economic acts.¹⁶ Thus, *Crisis_init* takes one if a president initiates a more serious crisis than economic sanctions. (Mean 0.03; SD 0.17).

Elec_prox: Number of months left until the next midterm or presidential election. Related literature: Drury (2001). (Mean 11.5; SD 6.93).

Prior_opinion: A lagged approval variable that measures the stability of public opinion of presidential performance. Related literature: Ostrom and Simon (1988).

Year1, *Year2*, and *Year4*: Dummy variables for each year of each presidential term.¹⁷ Related literature: Stimson (1976) and Brace and Hinckley (1992).

Tcounter: Number of months elapsed since the previous sanctions to the time of the next sanctions (that is, the inter-sanctions period). *Tcounter_sqd* is also included as a regressor to control for trend movements in other variables. Related literature: Carter and Signorino (2010).

References

- BALDWIN, DAVID. (1999–2000) The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice. *International Security* 24 (3): 80–107.
- BARBER, JAMES. (1979) Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument. *International Affairs* 55 (3): 367–384.
- BIERSTEKER, THOMAS J. (2004) Background Paper on Targeted Sanctions. Workshop on UN Sanctions, 2004. Targeted Financial Sanctions Project. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University.
- BRACE, PAUL, AND BARBARA HINCKLEY. (1992) *Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents*. New York: Basic Books.
- CARTER, DAVID, AND CURTIS SIGNORINO. (2010) Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data. *Political Analysis* 18: 271–292.
- COHEN, JEFFREY E. (2002) The Polls: Policy-Specific Presidential Approval, Part 2. *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 32 (4): 779–788.
- DAOUDI, M. S., AND M. S. DAJANI. (1983) *Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience*. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- DRURY, A. COOPER. (2001) Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy: The US President's Decision to Initiate Economic Sanctions. *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (3): 485–508.
- ELAND, IVAN. (1995) Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Foreign Policy. In *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft*, edited by David Cortright, and George Lopez. Lanham: Rowman and Little Field.
- FORDHAM, BENJAMIN. (1998) Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949–1994. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (4): 418–439.
- GALTUNG, JOHAN. (1967) On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia. *World Politics* 19 (3): 378–416.
- HUBBAUER, GARY CLYDE, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, AND BARBARA OEGG. (2008) *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 3rd edition. Washington, DC: The Institute for International Economics.
- JAMES, PATRICK, AND ATHANASIOS HRISTOULAS. (1994) Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: Evaluating a Model of Crisis Activity for the United States. *Journal of Politics* 56 (2): 327–348.

¹⁶ The break variable in the ICB has observations where the United States is a responder. In these cases, I code the United States as a crisis initiator only when the US response to crisis initiation by a target country was substantially intensive enough to be considered as a new crisis initiation. That is, *Crisis_init* takes one if a target initiates a crisis using non-military means ($\text{break} \leq 6$), but the United States responds by escalating it to a military crisis ($\text{majres} \geq 6$), where *majres* measures the extent of major response to crisis trigger in the ICB data set.

¹⁷ *Year3* is not included to avoid perfect multicollinearity.

- KAEMPFER, WILLIAM, AND ANTON LOWENBERG. (1988) The Theory of International Economic Sanctions. *American Economic Review* 78 (4): 786–793.
- KERNELL, SAMUEL. (1978) Explaining Presidential Popularity. *American Political Science Review* 76 (2): 506–522.
- LOPEZ, GEORGE, AND DAVID CORTRIGHT. (2004) Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked. *Foreign Affairs* 83 (4): 90–103.
- MACKUEN, M. (1983) Political Drama, Economic Conditions, and the Dynamics of Presidential Popularity. *American Political Science Review* 27 (2): 165–192.
- MARINOV, NIKOLAY. (2005) Does Pressure from the Outside Destabilize Leaders on the Inside? *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3): 564–576.
- MCAVOY, GREGORY E. (2006) Stability and Change: The Time Varying Impact of Economic and Foreign Policy Evaluations on Presidential Approval. *Political Research Quarterly* 59 (1): 71–83.
- MORGAN, T. CLIFTON, AND VALERIE L. SCHWEBACH. (1997) Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises. *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1): 27–50.
- MUELLER, JOHN E. (1973) *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*. New York: Wiley.
- NICKELSBURG, MICHAEL, AND HELMUT NORPOTH. (2000) Commander-In-Chief or Chief Economist? The President in the Eye of the Public. *Electoral Studies* 19 (2–3): 313–332.
- NINCIC, MIROSLAV, AND BARBARA HINCKLEY. (1991) Foreign Policy and the Evaluation of Presidential Candidates. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35 (2): 333–355.
- NINCIC, MIROSLAV, AND PETER WALLENSTEEN. (1983) *Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics*. New York: Praeger.
- OLSON, MANCUR. (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- OSTROM, W. CHARLES, AND BRIAN L. JOB. (1986) The President and the Political Use of Force. *American Political Science Review* 80 (2): 541–566.
- OSTROM, W. CHARLES, AND DENNIS M. SIMON. (1985) Promises and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity. *American Political Science Review* 79 (2): 334–358.
- OSTROM, W. CHARLES, AND DENNIS M. SIMON. (1988) The President's Public. *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (4): 1096–1119.
- SMITH, ALASTAIR. (1995) The Success and Use of Economic Sanctions. *International Interactions* 21 (3): 229–245.
- STIMSON, JAMES A. (1976) Public Support for American President: A Cyclical Model. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 40 (1): 1–21.