Exploring USAID’s democracy promotion in Bosnia and Afghanistan: a ‘cookie-cutter approach’?

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US democracy promotion is integral to the pursuit of the grand project of the American Mission. By promoting democracy America makes its role one of international engagement as opposed to one of isolation. The first part of this paper examines the political and cultural aspects of US democracy promotion in the post-Cold War era through the bi-polar framework of the case-specific versus one-size-fits-all. To better understand USAID’s democracy promotion policy, the second part takes this framework and applies it to its political reform strategy in Bosnia under the Clinton administration from 1995 to 2000 and Afghanistan under the Bush administration from 2001 to 2008. This paper confirms that America’s democracy promotion simultaneously employed both the case-specific and one-size-fits-all approaches. USAID programmes and projects did at times respond to local conditions but nevertheless appear to employ a blueprint design.

Keywords: US democracy promotion; Bosnia; Afghanistan; case-specific; one-size-fits-all

Introduction

One of the oldest political discussions in US foreign policy concerns the battle between isolationism and internationalism.1 Tapping into the discussion of the American Mission and applying it to the modern era, this overarching debate asks whether America should actively support the growth of democracies by instituting a policy of democratization or instead remain cautious in foreign interventions.2 Although different approaches were applied, this paper accepts that the Clinton and Bush administrations expanded the membership of the community of democracies under the aegis of internationalism. This paper adds detail to this grand debate by providing detail of two cases of international engagement.

Influenced by modernization theory, in 1961 the US government founded a new tool for its policy of promoting democracy.3 President Kennedy’s 1961
Foreign Relations Act established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).\(^4\) In Kennedy’s 1961 speech to Congress he explained that USAID would meet America’s political and economic ‘moral obligations as a wise leader and good neighbor in the interdependent community of free nations’.\(^5\) The president warned that not meeting these obligations would be disastrous for America’s security and economic interests because ‘widespread poverty and chaos’ would ‘collapse [...] the] political and social structures’ of countries and turn them towards ‘totalitarianism’.\(^6\) By the 1970s democratization literature began developing the transitional argument, and in response there was a policy shift in USAID away from modernization theory towards the end of that decade.\(^7\) The utility of transition theory is that it provided US foreign policy circles with a framework for attaining its national interests and values for a peaceful and democratic liberal world within a short time-frame. It is speedier than a structuralist theory because it does not wait ‘for economic conditions to mature or political struggles unleashed by economic change to be won’.\(^8\) Moreover, transition theory is an agency-based theory in that it suggests that democracy is achievable if ‘elites [...] learn the “right” way to proceed’, for ‘democracy [i]s created by conscious, committed actors, [...] that [...] possess a degree of luck and show a willingness to compromise’.\(^9\)

During the Reagan administration, USAID was part of a surge in a ‘new democracy-promotion community’ that fulfilled both America’s values mission and the overarching anti-communist national interest agenda.\(^10\) USAID, and other members of the ‘community’ observed the ‘third wave’ of democratizations in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Asia, and concluded that there was a ‘pressing need for an analytic framework to conceptualize and respond to the[se] ongoing political events’.\(^11\) The analytical framework applied by the American democracy community was a product of ‘their own interpretation of the patterns of democratic change taking place [in these cases], but also [...] from the early works of the emergent academic field of transitology, above all the seminal work of Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter’.\(^12\) From being a descriptive framework that interpreted prior transitions to democracy, USAID applied transition theory as a prescriptive framework. In examining these past transitions USAID focussed on two essential elements that a future state would need to successfully democratize. First, the state would need to develop democratic institutions, and second, it would need a supporting civil society to develop the required normative cultural behaviour. These two elements became the framework for USAID’s democracy promotion strategy.

Significant problems with this approach have arisen, in large part, due to the fact that a large number of the third wave transitions that influenced USAID’s policy have not consolidated their democratic status or have even reverted to their authoritarian status.\(^13\) If these countries’ own democratization did not work for them, why would the democracy promotion strategy developed from their transitions work for future transitions? This realisation is at the heart of the debate centred on whether USAID’s democracy promotion applies a case-by-case or a
homogenous ready-made implementation strategy. This paper examines this very debate between the *case-specific* and the *one-size-fits-all* schools. This examination is done by means of a comparative analysis, identifying whether local conditions are taken into consideration when designing USAID missions in two countries. This paper has chosen to compare mission strategies in two states that are very different: Bosnia and Afghanistan. Given the enormous differences between these two states, if the respective democracy promotion strategies were developed on the basis of analysis of local conditions (i.e. ‘case-by-case’) then the policies implemented could be expected to be very different in each case. If, on the other hand, a one-size-fits-all approach were taken, the respective policies could be expected to be very similar. The first part of this paper examines the political and cultural aspects of US democracy promotion in the post-Cold War era through the bi-polar framework of the *case-specific* versus *one-size-fits-all*. To better understand USAID’s democracy promotion policy, the second part takes this framework and applies it to its political reform strategy in Bosnia under the Clinton administration and Afghanistan under the Bush administration. The time-period for the analysis of USAID’s Bosnian mission begins with the successful completion of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in 1995 and ends in the last days of the Clinton administration in December 2000. The time-period for USAID’s Afghanistan mission begins with the Bonn Accords in December 2001 and continues through to the end of the Bush administration in December 2008.

**Setting the terms of analysis**

A criticism of USAID’s democracy promotion is that its strategy is the same across different states, and that USAID fails to take into account the unique structural and normative conditions of the state and society, ultimately impeding the country’s path to consolidated democracy. In this paper, this criticism is referred to as the *one-size-fits-all*. The counter position, elaborated by USAID, dismisses this criticism and holds that US democracy promotion strategies are designed according to the context of the state in question. In this paper, it will be referred to as the *case-specific*. This paper adds detail to this debate by investigating whether or not the criticisms made about USAID’s democracy promotion stands in light of the evidence gathered in this paper.

The US Agency for International Development and political analysts, including Gerald Hyman, Senior Advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former USAID official, suggest the *case-specific* argument applies to USAID’s operations. In this argument the design of USAID’s missions in the world are dependent on the specific context of each country. Hyman, in opposition to the *one-size-fits-all* argument, does not ‘agree that the strategies are exactly the same’. In his defence, he suggests there is a need to define ‘strategy’. Hyman concedes: ‘Yes, if by the strategy you mean building democracy then probably that’s right. [...] it’s true that democracy has some core [elements] to it, and in that respect the objective would be somewhat similar’. However, to Hyman the
key difference is the application of that strategy, and this is a product of ‘the environments [. . . being] so dramatically different.’ Referring specifically to democracy promotion in Bosnia and Afghanistan:

the kind of environment that you build [democracy] in are dramatically different in those two cases. And so was the approach — there’s no security umbrella in Afghanistan, there is no semblance of a national state; you are in a war environment. Bosnia was not a war environment, Bosnia was a peace environment. It came out of a war environment but you weren’t in the middle of a war.

Hyman uses a metaphor to expand on this:

it may contain similar elements but that’s like saying [ . . . ] it’s exactly the same house. [. . . ] It’s true they don’t look entirely alike but they used bricks, they used mortar, they used steel, they used glass. And they did exactly the same thing; they built a house that both keeps out the rain and keeps heat in the winter and keeps cool in the summer and people live in it. Exactly the same! Well, they are exactly the same in some ways but not in others. Yes, it’s true they’re both houses.

Considering a situation where there is a ‘common objective’ between two different democracy promotion cases, Hyman does not agree that ‘you do exactly the same programme in every place’. He says that this ‘shouldn’t be the case’, and in USAID ‘we tried to not make it the case’. This argument is evident in USAID’s development of a preliminary democracy assessment strategy. This process was designed to integrate case specificity into the framework of USAID’s democracy and governance programme area strategy and design. The assessment strategy ‘help[ed] define a country-appropriate program to assist in the transition to and consolidation of democracy’. The four steps of the strategic assessment laid out in the framework were designed to ‘assist practitioners as they think through the planning process [and] not dictate a cookie-cutter approach’. Each step involves analysing the identity of the political process ‘and of the problems relating to the transition or consolidation of democracy’, how that political process is engaged by the ‘actors, interests, resources, and strategies’, the institutional arenas that the political process is carried out in (‘legal, competitive, governmental, and civil society’) and finally analysing ‘the interests and resources of the donors, including USAID’.

In opposition, former USAID consultant David C. Korten and Marina Ottaway, a critic of contemporary US democracy promotion at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, amongst others, contend that the one-size-fits-all argument best describes USAID’s transition-influenced democracy promotion strategy in all its operations under Clinton and Bush. In explaining the genesis of this uniformity, Korten criticizes USAID’s decision-making process in its cultural development programmes. He compares this top-down process unfavourably to a bottom-up approach which designs projects and programmes through immediate and constant engagement with the community at the grassroots level. Projects by USAID can
be deployed at the grassroots level within its top-down organizational framework, but responsibility for design and implementation stays with USAID and is not placed at the door of the community.\textsuperscript{27} This approach is called the ‘blueprint approach’, whereby ‘experts at the top in the capital city design a project blueprint, build an organization from the top down, and try to do everything at once’.\textsuperscript{28} Ottaway supports this argument by concluding that the bureaucratic identity of USAID enforces homogeneity in its programme designs and in contractors’ project designs. In an interview with the author, Ottaway stated that ‘bureaucratic agencies [. . .] learn how to do certain things and tend to repeat themselves’.\textsuperscript{29} She used a metaphor to explain this argument, suggesting that different democracy programme areas should be termed ‘test tubes’: independent judiciary; civil society; independent media; political pluralism, and so on. A fully functioning and developed democracy would have all of these test tubes and they would tend to have them all filled up to the top. A country that is becoming a democracy only has these test tubes slightly filled. Democracy projects are being implemented precisely to elevate the level of these test tubes (programme areas) to the top. It is the bureaucratic framework in place that conditions the different programmes into creating projects that are concerned only with filling their own test tube to the top and in doing it in only one way. It is this formula that ‘encourages [. . . USAID] to think that [. . . it] can do the same thing in all countries, whether it is Afghanistan or whether it is Bosnia’.\textsuperscript{30} According to Ottaway, ‘what is missing in the democracy promotion programme [. . .] are the relations between all these different test tubes in that particular country’.\textsuperscript{31} Returning to the idea of bureaucratic homogeneity, Ottaway commented that she thought it was ‘very difficult’ for ‘bureaucratic organizations’ to ‘think conceptually’.\textsuperscript{32} This was because she thought bureaucratic organizations were ‘almost, by definition incapable of understanding’ these relationships.\textsuperscript{33} To support her point she referenced the negative results of the implementation of a generic USAID political pluralism programme in both Bosnia and Afghanistan.

What happens if you pour effort into the political parties column in a country like Bosnia? [. . .] you are developing ethnic political parties. What happens [. . .] if you pour effort into the development of institutions, in a county like Afghanistan? Well, the warlords take over the institutions, because they have the power.\textsuperscript{34}

With reference to initial democracy assessments, Ottaway remains critical of the bureaucratic impotence of USAID’s case specific framework:

I participated once in what they call a ‘democracy assessment’. [. . .] before designing a project [USAID . . .] sent[d] in some people to do some research and come up with recommendations. [The aim is to] try to understand the dynamics, the areas that seem to be more promising or not. Well, in the end, yes, this report, these studies are created. And then the bureaucratic process, [. . .] through its own capacity to implement programmes, [. . .] the programmes that come out exactly as if there had not been a democracy assessment.\textsuperscript{35}
The landscape of USAID’s democracy promotion missions

This analysis distinguishes between four different levels to a USAID democracy promotion mission: (1) an overall programme; (2) specific programme areas; (3) sub-programmes, and (4) individual projects (see Figure 1). The overall programme is the implementation of a strategy designed to establish a market democracy. Specific programme areas are those areas that help to establish and maintain a market democracy: reconstruction and humanitarian aid, political reforms and economic reforms. Within each programme area there are sub-programmes and within these there are a number of individual projects. These individual projects were those contracted out to private sector and not-for-profit organizations to implement. For example, a specific programme area would be the political liberalization area, a sub-programme would be to implement an independent media, and one individual project to achieve that would be to develop an ethical code of conduct for the national and local media outlets.

Examining US strategies in Bosnia and Afghanistan

Having outlined the debate that exists within contemporary analysis of US democracy promotion the remainder of this paper will use a comparative approach to determine whether USAID’s missions relate to the conditions on the ground or a top-down blueprint approach. If it were the case that exactly the same strategies, at all four mission levels (a strict blueprint approach), were employed in two very different states, a good case could be made that any attempts to identify local conditions in order to develop a democratization strategy are outweighed by the weight of the blueprint. Indeed, at mission levels 1 and 2 the data suggests that USAID’s democratization strategies in Bosnia and Afghanistan implemented identical programmes. At mission levels 3 and 4 the evidence suggests that USAID implemented very similar (albeit not identical) programmes and projects to develop democratic institutions and a supporting democratic culture.

Bosnia and Afghanistan were chosen for this analysis because the conditions of the two countries, before a democracy strategy was implemented by USAID, indicate that their respective paths to a modernized state were at completely different levels. Bosnia was an industrial developing country, while Afghanistan was a
pre-industrial developing country. Bosnia had the strong foundations of a modern relationship between the polity and the government; Afghanistan had never really functioned as a modern state with central government control over the whole country. The American government described the political system of Bosnia during the civil war (before Dayton) as being controlled by a ‘nationalist party’, employing ‘martial law’, with ‘no elections since 1990’, ‘rubber-stamp parliaments’, and ‘harassed’ and ‘weak opposition parties’.36 Despite these realities, there was a modern social contract between the government of Bosnia and a large percentage of the population (predominantly Bosnian Croats and Muslims). This was evident in the high voter turnout at the November 1990 elections and in the 29 February 1992 independence referendum, when Bosnian Muslims and Croats (63% of the Republic’s population) voted overwhelmingly for independence.37 Afghanistan, on the other hand, had been severely lacking in internationally popular standards of government and state responsibility before the Taliban became the legitimate, yet contested, leaders of the country in 1996. In 1973 King Shah was deposed, and a military dictatorship ruled until 1978, when communist rule and Soviet military support were implemented. In 1989 the Soviets withdrew. By 1992 the government was deposed and four years of ‘anarchy and civil war’ followed.38 The Taliban government took control of Kabul and a large percentage of the countryside but was removed in late 2001 by US-led coalition forces and replaced with a state ‘transitioning to democracy’.39 According to a USAID report, ‘sequential crises [. . . ] during the Taliban regime and prior wars’ created a weak institutional infrastructure.40 For all these reasons, Afghanistan has been referred to as less a state and more a geographical space between countries.41 USAID’s Mark Ward declared: ‘In many ways, we are not doing RE-construction work in Afghanistan, but are constructing much of the infrastructure for the first time ever’.42

Comparing political liberalization reforms in Bosnia and Afghanistan

Having established the structural differences between Bosnia and Afghanistan, the scene is set to make a comparative analysis of USAID’s implementation of institutional and cultural programmes designed to foster the two states transition into liberal democracies. It is important to keep in mind the context in which this analysis is sought. Analysis of specific examples of USAID’s democracy promotion programmes and projects (i.e. the Parliamentary assistance projects) are made simply to support this comparative analysis. A critical evaluation of the success or failure of designated programmes and projects on the political systems and peoples of Bosnia and Afghanistan, whilst important, are beyond the remit of this paper.

Mission levels 1 and 2

In mission levels 1 and 2 the comparative analysis is straightforward because they are identical. In both cases the US government’s promise was to promote liberal
democracy in both cases through promoting political and economic liberalization, as well as to support their physical reconstruction. These commitments were replicated in practice through the design, funding, and implementation of policies and programmes aimed at establishing peaceful, stable, democratic, and market-based states. The specific role of the physical reconstruction efforts was to create the infrastructure necessary for successful economic and political reforms. The economic and political reforms themselves were designed especially to establish a stable nation-state with a democratic identity and a market-based economy. These three elements were interdependent: economic growth depends on political stability; democratic stability requires economic prosperity; and economic growth and democratic stability both need to work from a developed infrastructure.

Of the three specific programme areas (reconstruction and humanitarian aid, political liberalization, and economic liberalization), the scope of this paper’s comparative analysis is democratic political liberalization. In 1996, the Clinton administration confirmed its mission was to ‘establish a civil society in Bosnia in which independent media are operating; the rule of law is generally accepted; and democratically elected institutions are operating at every level’. This clearly indicates that Clinton was supporting the implementation of political and electoral institutions and a democratic cultural development programme. On 21 November 1995 Clinton outlined the new Bosnian state that the warring parties had agreed to create, and that America had agreed to support:

There will be an effective central government, including a national parliament, a presidency and a constitutional court, with responsibility for foreign policy, foreign trade, monetary policy, citizenship, immigration and other important functions.

The presidency and the parliament will be chosen through free democratic elections, held under international supervision. [...] People will be able to move freely throughout Bosnia. And the human rights of every Bosnian citizen will be monitored by an independent commission and an internationally trained civilian police.

These political liberalizing themes were frequently repeated in other speeches and policy papers of the Clinton administration. For example, on 2 and 5 December 1995 Clinton spoke first to members of the US military and then to the press pool about the Bosnian peace agreement. Both speeches contained an American commitment to supporting democratic elections as part of the long-term peace plan.

This commitment by Clinton is comparable to the commitment the American government made to Afghanistan in 2002. US President George Bush and Afghan Chairman Hamid Karzai committed themselves, and the nations they represented, to establishing a ‘representative and accountable national government’ in Afghanistan. Their joint statement outlined how Afghanistan was to become a democracy with a suitable institutional and cultural framework. America was to:

support collaborative programs to strengthen Afghan civic institutions, working through Afghan and American NGOs to build and strengthen political structures,
independent media, human rights protections, labor unions, accountability and anti-corruption initiatives.\textsuperscript{47}

This democratization theme was frequently repeated by Bush throughout both his terms. During the summer months of 2004, on the campaign trail just before the November presidential elections, this commitment had been bite-sized to ‘Afghanistan is a rising democracy’.\textsuperscript{48}

\textit{Mission levels 3 and 4}

This section provides a comparative analysis of USAID’s democracy reforms in Bosnia under the Clinton administration and in Afghanistan under the Bush administration and identifies the similarities and dissimilarities of each of these political liberalization sub-programme areas and projects.\textsuperscript{49} In Bosnia, America’s support for this democratization policy was orchestrated by USAID but also involved other departments including the Treasury, Defense, and State. USAID’s aim was to establish ‘strong, enduring democratic institutions in a just and multi-ethnic society’.\textsuperscript{50} This statement is a clear indication of America’s commitment to providing the transition commitment of institutions, electoral reform, and political and social cultural development. Moreover, this commitment is evident in the 1998, 2000, and 2001 USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina performance reviews, where the objectives of USAID’s democratic reform mission were encapsulated in four points. First, to create an independent media that was viable and offered ‘consistent, objective and balanced information to all citizens’.\textsuperscript{51} Second, to develop both a ‘pluralistic party structure’ and a high voter turn-out in free and fair elections.\textsuperscript{52} The third objective was to develop ‘a pro-democratic political leadership providing transparent and accountable governing in response to a vibrant civil society’, and the fourth was to create an independent and professional judiciary within an environment ‘governed by the rule of law’.\textsuperscript{53}

In Afghanistan, the Bush administration’s commitment to the political liberalization of Afghanistan was also enacted through USAID with the support of other US government departments. Although different in its logistical breakdown, the US government had the same vocal commitment in Afghanistan to develop a market-based democracy as it had in Bosnia. Constructing and reconstructing Afghanistan required three stages. Stage One involved humanitarian and relief assistance and began in late September 2001, whilst Stage Two, which is still ongoing, replaced the first stage during the fiscal year 2004, and involved stabilising the country and ‘building systems that will act as a bridge to the third and final stage’.\textsuperscript{54} This final stage is aimed at developing and maintaining ‘an environment with a legitimate government and a market-based licit economy’.\textsuperscript{55} This stage will not begin in earnest until after stage two is completed, which, according to various USAID documents and statements, will not be until 2010.\textsuperscript{56} To achieve a democratic political system and society USAID has, so far, employed seven closely integrated operational aims, which it termed Strategic Objectives (SOs).
Four SOs were initiated in Stage One, at the start of USAID’s engagement in Afghanistan post-Taliban. SO 3 is one of those and is the concern of this paper because its aim was to ensure the redevelopment of Afghanistan as a nation-state in part by instituting a democratically based political system.57 Within two years the first three had evolved into three new SOs in Stage Two, whilst the fourth maintained its role in providing programme support for the others. SO 6 is one of those three new ones and is the focus of this investigation as it supports the requirements for democratization.58 This objective has new directives as well as having incorporated the democratic element to SO 3.

In conclusion, the evidence suggests that the sub-programme areas (mission level 3) of Bosnia and Afghanistan are near-identical. In spite of the different contextual situations for USAID’s engagement, the two US presidents in Bosnia and Afghanistan supported the same sub-programme areas which strengthened the media in order for it to be more independent, introduced the mechanisms necessary for free and fair elections, supported the growth of plural politics, obtained public accountability of the government by developing its civil society, developed an independent judiciary, and developed checks and balances to deter arbitrary power by instituting accountable local and national government. The following comparative analysis of the sub-programme areas and projects assesses whether or not the two USAID missions at levels 3 and 4, while similar in US government pronouncements, also have similar implementation strategies.

**Development of the media**

The development of a media no longer dependent on the former regime’s priorities was fundamental to USAID’s appreciation of what was required for the democratic development of Bosnia and Afghanistan. These policies claimed not only to cement a break from the previous regime, but also to encourage public discussion and support the general development of a democratic civil society. This was partly reflected in a fact sheet on American media development in Afghanistan, which could equally have applied to the engagement in Bosnia. USAID claimed to support ‘media development […] to promote the free exchange of information and ideas vital to the democratic process and development of civil society’.59 In both cases, Internews was contracted by USAID.

Similarities in the media sub-programmes and projects are evident in a number of annual, evaluation, and final reports written either by the project contractors or by assessment teams. In the Clinton administration’s annual reports on Bosnia, USAID support was broken down into five areas: technical assistance and training; production support; program distribution; financial assistance for production; and a regulatory framework to provide ethical codification. Although this aspect of USAID’s Afghan mission was not broken down into the same segments as in Bosnia, the aims and objectives of the sub-programme’s projects were the same. This is evident in the following extract on USAID’s responsibilities: ‘building the capacity of local, state and independent broadcast media through technical
support, equipment up-grade, hands-on training in balanced and accurate reporting, and development of an Afghan media policy and regulatory framework’. Another comparable example between the two strategies can be seen in the importance attributed to developing radio and television stations and programmes which would promote the political participation of the population. For example, in Bosnia radio and television stations began to disseminate alternate democratic political ideas to counter ethno-nationalist views. This was achieved by USAID/OTI giving grants to help create ‘a variety of contact programs on radio and television’. These contact programmes allowed ‘political candidates and elected officials to communicate their positions to a wide audience. These programs let the public call in and ask important questions’. This format was seen as important in developing civil society, because ‘it [gave] the public an opportunity to ask difficult questions about important issues’, and ‘broadcast contact shows offer[ed] opposition candidates media exposure that the state controlled media refuse[d] to give’. In Afghanistan, political participation of the public was also a priority of USAID. According to Internews:

Local communities have embraced the media in a manner never before seen across Afghanistan, spurred by the host of high quality radio broadcasts distributed across the nation, covering topics that range from health, education, raising children, to agriculture and politics.

Differences between the circumstances in the two countries developed different priorities for the projects. One such difference that concerned the sub-programme development of an independent media was the much higher illiteracy rate in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was ‘an orally based culture, where illiteracy is rife and where newspapers and televisions are prohibitively expensive for a significant bulk of the population, radio broadcasting offers a cheap alternative’. Higher illiteracy meant that resources were concentrated on developing radio stations. In Bosnia the illiteracy rate was much lower, and therefore, more support was directed at the print media than is the case in Afghanistan. As a result of the lower socio-economic status of the average Afghan it was necessary to contribute significant funding towards handing out transistor radios to Afghans. In Bosnia this was not necessary because radios were not in short supply.

Elections and electoral administrative development

The development of a representative electoral system and the holding of democratic elections demonstrate another sub-programme similarity in America’s democratization strategy. In both Afghanistan and Bosnia, the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) was contracted by USAID to fulfil the American government’s commitment to supporting democratic elections. In both countries, in order to achieve its goal, IFES operated a twin approach. It supported the administration of elections and the education of the public about the technical intricacies
of the electoral process. In Afghanistan, the American government contracted IFES to implement projects that supported ‘the development of a credible electoral administration’. An IFES quarterly report for the two-year Supporting Elections in Afghanistan (SEA) project, detailed its objectives. It stated that it supported ‘fair and participatory 2004 and 2005 national elections by providing targeted assistance in strategic planning and organizational support to the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the pending national electoral body’. Although this referred to Afghanistan it could equally have applied to the IFES Bosnian project. In the 1998 USAID annual review of the operation in Bosnia in 1998, USAID stated that it had, ‘through the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), [...] provided specialized technical assistance directly to the OSCE for supervising the four elections held since Dayton’. In a review of its Bosnian operation IFES noted it was contracted to ‘maintain [...] technical assistance to the OSCE [...] and to support the transition from OSCE-supervised and heavily administered elections to Bosnian ownership of the electoral process’.

In both Bosnia and Afghanistan, the voter education projects were aimed at educating the public on election issues, including how to vote. In Bosnia, by the time of the September 1997 municipal council elections IFES had ‘held over 2,300 voter education sessions with 33,000 participants on voter registration and the broader electoral process’ according to a 1998 USAID report. In Afghanistan, it provided citizen education projects in the run up to the September 2005 parliamentary elections, aimed at ‘increasing knowledge about, and participation in, the political process – particularly for women and ethnic minorities’.

The implementation of the respective projects pertaining to elections was more similar than dissimilar. However, there was one difference as a consequence of the different structural contexts. In Bosnia, the encouragement of democratically minded and non-ethnic or nationalist parties to seek office was an intrinsic factor to America’s desire to have a free and fair electoral system. The high impact of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the prevalence of ethno-nationalist political parties in both entities – the Federation and Republika Srpska – led to American concern that democratically minded parties would have difficulty developing support. Therefore, included in the Dayton Peace Agreement was a provision for displaced persons to have the right to vote in the areas they had been ‘cleansed’ from. This was structurally to ‘counteract the effects of ethnic cleansing by encouraging people to use their absentee votes against the extremists that had evicted them’. By making such refugees a voter block, the incentive for the political parties to de-ethnicise and nationalise in order to garner their support intensified. In Afghanistan, the war between the Taliban/al-Qaeda against the Northern Alliance and the international community was also based on ethnic identity:

The Northern Alliance commands little trust among southern Pashtuns, who view it as a political vehicle for the interests of the northern Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Northerners are similarly wary of their prospects under Pashtun domination of the country.
However, despite ethnic tensions between the many groups existing in close proximity, ethnic cleansing was not an enforced policy of any of the warring parties. As a result of these dynamics in Afghanistan, the American-supported international election programme did not have to deal with the need for refugees to vote from outside their ethnically ‘cleansed’ areas or the resultant political party dynamics that ‘cleansing’ had created.

Political pluralism

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was employed by USAID in Bosnia and Afghanistan to develop the political pluralism sub-programme area. In each country it was similarly aimed at developing a conglomerate of democratic political parties by creating representative, responsive and transparent party structures, whose political partisanship was based on non-ethnic or nationalist lines. The aim of developing democratically minded political parties was implemented through an assistance project that developed the parties’ grassroots bases, media relations, strategic planning, message development, financial campaigns, and voter outreach programmes, and instructed them on how to conduct coalition building. The purpose of this all-encompassing support was to provide a professional and well-developed alternative to nationalist or ethnic politics during elections. USAID’s involvement in political pluralism in Bosnia had been producing ‘improvements in opposition (moderate) political parties in the Federation and RS since [the] June 1996 [elections]’. In the case of Afghanistan this project was not implemented until the run-up to the parliamentary elections held in September 2005.

In both Bosnia and Afghanistan, American support for the new legislative assemblies followed similar paths. In each, the aim was to provide the necessary operational infrastructure required for their running. This is well expressed in the State University of New York’s Center for International Development (SUNY/CID) quarterly report on Afghanistan, which could equally apply to USAID’s programme in Bosnia: ‘The goal of the contract is provision of required technical and logistical assistance in the successful establishment of a functional, independent National Assembly of Afghanistan, as contemplated in the newly adopted Afghan Constitution.’ In Bosnia this programme was called the Parliamentary Development Program (PDP), while in Afghanistan it was called the Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project (APAP). In both countries the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) were employed by USAID to carry out these tasks.

The project designs differed in some of their objectives because of the legislative and organizational differences between the two countries. The principal difference was that in Bosnia there was a two-tiered national government legislative process consisting of the entity level (Republika Srpska and the Federation) and the state level (Bosnia-Herzegovina). Regarding cross-entity support, NDI worked with ‘state-level institutions in order to ensure the sustainability of democratic development efforts across entity lines. To that end, NDI [was] working with
MPs in the BiH Parliament on committee development and constituency relations. In Afghanistan, there was only one national level of the legislative process, so cross-entity support programmes were unnecessary.

Civil society

Both the Clinton and Bush administrations supported the development of a civic space which would encourage the public to force the government to be representative of their interests and more accountable. According to the 1998 USAID Bosnian reconstruction report, ‘democracy must be institutionalized through a culture of participation in which individual citizens emerge as central political actors and give direction to political structures’. Similarly, the Bush administration described USAID’s role as supporting ‘Afghan NGOs to help build a dynamic Afghan civil society that can hold policy makers accountable, promote democratic principles, and engage as full partners with government and the private sector in the economic and political development of Afghanistan’. Both administrations saw the need to provide training, technical assistance, and small grants to help NGOs sustain themselves, so making civil society stronger.

A difference in focus between the two civil society programmes can be discerned. Although both held that the development of women’s NGOs was essential to the development of civil society, there was greater emphasis on this in Afghanistan, particularly in the initial phase of USAID support from 2001 to 2004. Under USAID’s SO 3 the priority was to develop organizations that improved the role of women in Afghan society post-Taliban. One example is the support given by Ministry of Women’s Affairs in establishing women’s centres. However, this focus did not discount ‘other initiatives intended to spur free, open debate about the future of Afghanistan’. By 2004, grants awarded to women-focused NGOs accounted for 50% of those awarded to NGOs. The other awards focused on the same areas as USAID’s Bosnian civil society project, as outlined below.

In contrast, US support in Bosnia was by no means aimed predominantly at women’s issues but was equally weighted towards a number of other societal issues. It focused on the development of civic advocacy organizations that supported the needs of society, and civic education projects aimed at raising political awareness. In civic advocacy it worked on ‘developing the sustainability of a core group of NGOs in four major sectors of activity: democracy/governance, rule of law, women’s issues, and business’. This broad-spectrum approach was reflected in the civic education projects that assisted ‘communities in conducting opinion surveys to identify issues of common interest, organizing panel discussions or public hearings, and communicating effectively with elected representatives’.

There was no USAID statutory requirement that ensured projects were aimed towards women and no statistics are available on the percentage of civil society projects that were aimed directly at developing women focused NGOs in Bosnia. The principal reason for this difference between USAID’s strategies in
Afghanistan and Bosnia stems from the perceived different treatment of women by men and society in the two countries.\textsuperscript{90}

**Judiciary**

Both administrations accepted that the development of an independent judiciary was essential for the political and economic development of the two countries. There was recognition in both administrations that the rule of law enforced property law, essential for privatization, criminal law, social stability, and security. During the Clinton administration, USAID declared that the aim of judicial reform was to contribute to enforcing the rule of law.\textsuperscript{91} In the Bush administration USAID maintained this view, commenting in one of its annual Afghanistan reports that ‘in post-conflict situations, reaffirming the centrality of the rule of law is a key prerequisite for the success of the reconstruction process’.\textsuperscript{92}

In both cases creating an independent judiciary involved implementing projects designed to ‘increase professionalism of judicial sector personnel, [...] strengthen the institutional capacity of critical judicial institutions’, increase ‘efficiency of court administration’, and ‘support drafting, legal translation, harmonization, indexing, and codification of laws’.\textsuperscript{93} In Bosnia, USAID with the support of ABA/CEELI helped both the Federation and Republika Srpska establish judicial institutions. In Afghanistan, USAID continued to work on the infrastructure and the training of personnel by supporting the establishment of a National Legal Training Center in Kabul, along with the Italian government.\textsuperscript{94}

There are two major differences regarding the implementation of US judicial reform strategies in Bosnia and Afghanistan. The first was a product of the different predominant illegal activities in the two countries. In Afghanistan, USAID judicial reform concentrated on the need for the judiciary to engage the rule of law in enforcing the illegality of the drug trade with a view to destroying it. In Bosnia US judicial reform was concerned primarily with the problem of people trafficking. USAID contracted the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to support the government of Bosnia in halting the problem of trafficking.\textsuperscript{95} The second major difference arose from the need to accommodate the competing system of customary laws and informal justice into Afghanistan’s central government’s judicial operating framework. No such competing alternative existed in the promotion of an independent judiciary by the international community in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{96}

**Local government**

The focus of local governance projects in Bosnia and Afghanistan differed quite drastically. The administrative bottom-up focus of US support in Bosnia compared to its central government top-down focus in Afghanistan is integral to this difference. In Bosnia, USAID focused exclusively on developing the Brcko District. Its aim was to integrate and consolidate three formerly ethnically divided municipalities and their utilities into a single municipality serving all
three ethnic areas. In Afghanistan, USAID local governance support had a broader approach, working on projects aimed at supporting all Provincial Councils and other local and regional government strata in an effort to extend the reach of the central government.

In spite of the different levels of implementation, USAID strategies in both Bosnia and Afghanistan were aimed at developing the infrastructure of the sub-national level of government. Some projects had similar objectives. In both countries, projects provided technical assistance. In Afghanistan, it supported services in the ‘health, education, and urban waste and waste-water management’ sectors. USAID also supported the new Provisional Council structure by training staff in ‘basic administration, budgeting, and constituent relations’. In Bosnia, the same services activities were implemented but were referred to as ‘utilities management’. USAID also provided technical assistance in Bosnia: ‘capital improvements, municipal and personnel management, budgeting, taxes, finance, economic development, land use planning and data base management. […] Technical assistance was also provided to the Special District Supervisor with respect to laws and regulations affecting the operation of the District government’.100

Findings: limited case specificity

Hyman’s core point was that strategies may appear similar but the application of the strategies is what differs. The evidence appears to confirm this point. In summarizing the evidence outlined in the previous section, the differences in sub-programme and project design indicate that the way that policies were implemented did at times differ according to conditions on the ground. However, the eventual goal did not differ. Ultimately, the US was still applying a cookie-cutter approach to democratization. In the overall programme and specific programme areas (mission levels 1 and 2) the evidence overwhelmingly identifies that there is no space for case specificity, the areas are identical. At the sub-programme and project areas (mission levels 3 and 4) the two missions are clearly related. However, in terms of programme and project implementation and as a result of their specific context, there is some evidence of limited case-specificity. For example, in comparing USAID’s civil society sub-programme areas in Bosnia and Afghanistan it is clear that both USAID missions aimed to make the two governments publicly accountable. There were some differences in how these aims were realized. In Afghanistan unlike in Bosnia, USAID made the decision to provide half of all civil society support to those NGOs that concentrated on women-focused issues. Another example is in the political pluralism sub-programme areas where USAID had the identical strategic aim in both countries to develop liberal-minded political parties. However, due to the legislative and organizational differences the sub-programmes and their projects differed in respect to how this aim was carried out. It is clear, then, that USAID’s democracy promotion, at the level of policy implementation, is able to respond to conditions on the ground. This paper has confirmed that there is case specificity but the
questions remain, to what degree, and does it dominate the one-size-fits-all opinion that mission design is a top-down implemented blueprint? It is to this question that the next section provides some preliminary analytical framing and conclusions.

Concluding points and future research
Having already determined that case specificity exists, it is essential for future research to determine to what degree it exists. Elucidating the analytical framework that future research will apply is best served by using an example. In Afghanistan there had been no independent media; the media had previously reported according to the regime’s priorities. It is evident from the analysis that USAID’s strategy for a print and broadcast media that supports democracy was to some degree case-specific. One example is the focus on broadcast media over print due to the high levels of illiteracy.

To determine the degree of case specificity it is necessary to ask the extent to which local voices are listened to. A strategy may be nominally case-specific if it does not consider local voices, but will to some extent adapt its strategy according to conditions on the ground. In the case of the media, a nominally case-specific implementation strategy would mean that USAID-employed staff detail what the media sector is lacking and then implement a mission strategy based on a blueprint on how to rectify these deficiencies. On the other hand, a genuinely case-specific strategy will make this adaptation but will also consider the local voices in the mission design. In this case, USAID would not only have to acknowledge that the local conditions require the infrastructural development and training of technicians, journalists, distributors, and production workers but also that it tailor its support to the needs of the local community. This type of mission design listens to local voices and culture on what, where, and how the media package is to be implemented. This might include something as straight-forward as asking local people what they want from a local radio station news programme or as complicated as determining the degree to which the agency will fund training when there is a station policy to discriminate against women. In the latter example, a genuinely case-specific approach would acknowledge that universal values are not culturally relevant because the state does not have the institutional or normative capacity to support them. This understanding does not preclude that the country can or should adopt these values but that the people and state may not be able to support them at that time. In conclusion, if only nominal case specificity is applied, then case-specificity exists but is constrained by the blueprint as detailed by the one-size-fits-all school. If genuine case-specificity is applied then case-specificity runs through the entire mission and any blueprint is adapted specifically for the state and society in question.

Preliminary research suggests that any differences do not go far enough to break the hold that the top-down blueprint approach has on USAID democracy-promotion missions. According to research undertaken by political scientist Matthew Spence USAID missions ‘follow[ed] a similar operating model
The worldwide similarity of USAID’s democracy promotion strategy is confirmed by Carothers in an article written in 2001. In talking about its mission in Russia and Guatemala he suggested that they were basically the same strategies. USAID’s strategies were similar irrespective of contextual difference:

In Guatemala for example, USAID has been working for 15 years to aid democracy by supporting the reform of the judiciary and the legislature while also trying to bolster the development of NGOs both in the capital and the countryside. In Russia, a country with an entirely different political background, USAID’s democracy efforts have been basically similar.

Accepting the logic behind this research suggests that all existing USAID democratization missions, including Bosnia and Afghanistan, are based on a generic design. If future research is to examine the varying levels of case specificity and blueprint homogeneity in mission levels 3 and 4, it must also identify and explain those forces that are imposing the blueprint design on a country’s democratization mission. The forces include theoretical constraints, problems with the way that democratization programmes are evaluated, and bureaucratic homogeneity.

The introduction to this paper discussed the prescriptive nature of transition theory and its influence in USAID mission design. A criticism of the application of this theory is that it considers democracy can be implemented in any state at any developmental stage just by filling up Ottaway’s test tubes of independent media, civil society, and so on. The problem with this attitude is that it removes any notion that democracy needs a supporting liberal set of norms, or at least derogates the reality that a culture with these norms takes decades to develop. This assumption has been interpreted by Ray Kiely as ‘the implicit linearity combined with state-centrism’. He concludes that this is very similar to the argument proposed by modernization theory, in which both USAID and transition theory have their roots: ‘Essentially, some (war-prone) states “lack” what (peaceful) states have, namely, a liberal democratic state and prosperous, free market economy. Therefore, the former must catch up with the latter’. Acknowledging this fatal flaw in the design process highlights the flaws in USAID’s implementation strategy and suggests that the influence of a top-down blueprint is strong.

Applicable to Bosnia and Afghanistan, mission replication across contexts may be partly a result of inherent problems with the way that democratization programmes are evaluated. In reviewing eight projects (four by USAID and four by the World Bank) Paul Clements concludes that: ‘The general picture is one of chronically poor informational standards contributing to unsatisfactory outcomes, and significant positive bias in reported results.’ This sentiment is confirmed by William Easterly: ‘what evaluation does take place is self-evaluation, using reports from the very people who implemented the project’. To support his argument, Easterly quotes an OECD and UNDP report on Mali. The report questions whether there is a disconnect between the reported success of the projects and
the development of the country: ‘it has to be asked how the largely positive findings of the evaluations can be reconciled with the poor development outcomes observed over the same period (1985–95) and the unfavorable views of local people’.108 As a result, the report suggests that ‘the degree to which project objectives are achieved during the actual project period clearly fails to give a proper reflection of the lasting impact on standards of living’.109

Peter Stavrakis suggests one explanation for this uncritical evaluation was because contractors were fearful of complaining to USAID about the required project objectives for fear they would either be replaced on that project or would not be offered future contracts. Stavrakis comments that ‘most US contractors – who privately share scathing criticisms of USAID practices – are reluctant to go on the record for fear that it will jeopardize their chances for future assistance contracts’.110 In Afghanistan for example, democratization may employ a replica strategy from other missions because of the high level of insecurity in the country. Programme strategizing and project designing become problematic because USAID country-based staff cannot interact with the local community in initiating democracy assessments.111 Implementation becomes susceptible to a caricature of reality ‘on the ground’, reliance on previous missions and a head office blueprint. Because the overseers stay within the grounds of the Provisional Reconstruction Team barracks they rely on what local people and politicians tell them and not what they can personally assess. Information can be limited, out of date, and unreliable.112 In Bosnia, there was not such a high level of insecurity for USAID contracted aid workers, and as such, it was certainly possible that USAID and these workers could consult the local community regarding project design, and implement projects (bottom-up approach). However, the blueprint held out over a case-specific approach that consulted the local community because the ‘world’s most powerful states’ wanted to manage Bosnia’s development.113

A blueprint approach may be further explained by the fact that, in the mainstay, USAID contracts are given to US organizations. According to ‘USAID’s own internal reporting’, reporter Josh Kurlantzick concludes that ‘as much as 80% of its total budget goes to American goods and American contractors’.114 According to Curt Tarnoff, in one mission in the former Soviet Union, ‘roughly 78% of those funds used for programs run by USAID are spent on US goods and services’.115 The impact of this ‘Western-American-Washington Beltway identity’ is premised on the notion that USAID and the US organizations operate from the same set of base assumptions on what projects are needed to develop democracy and how they are to be implemented. The organizations contracted are chosen, in part, precisely because they mirror what USAID wants. Also, it is worth noting that there is a significant level of continuity between contracted organizations employed during both missions. Over time, a small cadre of organizations reap the benefit of USAID contracts. Thomas Carothers comments: ‘There are certainly problems with the ways USAID chooses its partners […] The biggest problem is that the organization’s contracting processes often limit the bidding for larger projects to
a small circle of organizations.116 In the time-periods that this paper covers, there were 11 major organizations contracted by USAID in both countries in supporting its overall programme strategy (humanitarian and reconstruction aid, political liberalization, and economic liberalization). This means that one out of every seven major organizations employed in each country was the same.117

Determining the degree to which USAID missions are dependent on the local conditions and voices, as well as head office in Washington DC, is important because it explains why US democratization succeeds and fails in consolidating democracy. With this knowledge future US administrations will be able to better design their missions.

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Notes
1. For a discussion of isolationism see Adler, The Isolationist Impulse and Doenecke, Not to the Swift. For internationalism see Hoffman, ‘The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’ and Doyle, Ways of War and Peace.
2. For a great review of the different positions in this debate see Posen and Ross, ‘Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy’.
5. President John F. Kennedy, ‘Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid’.
6. Ibid.
7. The transitional argument is called either transition theory or transitology. See Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 15–16.
8. Ibid., 56.
11. Ibid., 5–6.
12. Transitology = transition theory. Ibid.
13. Those countries that have not consolidated their initial democratic transition include Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, and Egypt. Those that have reverted to authoritarian regimes include Uzbekistan, Belarus, Togo, Congo, and Turkmenistan. Taken from Carothers, ‘The End of The Transition Paradigm’.
14. This critical framework is utilised by a number of experts including Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Also, Christopher Daase from the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt examines this argument using the cases of the European Union, African Union, Organization of American States, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
27. Carothers, ‘Democracy, State and AID’.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact Sheet Background on Bosnia and Herzegovina’.
37. Rieff, *Slaughterhouse Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 16.
38. Details in paragraph and quote taken from Figure 2 in GAO, *Afghanistan Reconstruction*, 8.
39. Ibid.
43. USG, *Fact Sheet Implementing the Peace in Bosnia*.
44. President Clinton, ‘Presidential Statement on Bosnia Peace Agreement’.
45. President Clinton, ‘Speech by President to Soldiers at Task Force Eagle’ and ‘Speech by President on Bosnia Peace Accord’.
46. USG and TISA, ‘Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Chairman Hamid Karzai’.
47. Ibid.
48. For example, the election speech made at a rally on 29 July 2004 Springfield, Missouri.
49. The aim of this section is to identify a number of examples of similarities and dissimilarities that provide an overall picture of the relationship between the two USAID missions. It is not meant to be exhaustive but to be demonstrative. For greater detail of America’s democracy promotion in Bosnia and Afghanistan see Hill, ‘The Transition from Conflict to Post-Conflict’.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. USAID, USAID Media Development in Afghanistan Fact Sheet, 1.
60. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. In the CIA World Factbook 1996 the literacy rate of the Bosnian people was reported as 91% (no age or gender breakdown recorded). In the CIA World Factbook 2000 the literacy rates of the over 15s in Afghanistan was 31.5% of the total population (broken down by gender it was 47.2% for males and 15% for females (1999 est.)).
67. By January 2006 40,000 radios had been handed out to ‘vulnerable populations including rural women’. USAID, USAID Media Development in Afghanistan Fact Sheet.
69. This project ran from 1 March 2003 to 31 August 2005.
70. IFES, IFES Quarterly Report, 1.
71. USAID, USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnian Reconstruction Program, 19.
72. Cepeda et al., Technical Election Advisors to the Provisional Election Commission, 7.
73. USAID, USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnian Reconstruction Program, 21.
74. IFES, IFES Quarterly Report, 1.
75. See International Crisis Group, Bosnia’s November Elections.
76. Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets, 155.
77. Ibid.
78. International Affairs and Defence Section, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom and the Conflict in Afghanistan’.
79. According to a USAID Bosnian report, the aim of ‘political pluralism’ is to erode ‘single party hegemony’. USAID, USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnian Reconstruction Program, 20.
80. Ibid.
82. In the case of Afghanistan SUNY was also involved in implementing a support project for the new legislature.
83. National Democratic Institute, Bosnia-Hercegovina: Political and Civic Organizing, 1.
84. USAID, USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnian Reconstruction Program, 24.
86. For Clinton see USAID, USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnian Reconstruction Program, 24–25; for Bush see USAID, USAID/Afghanistan Strategic Plan 2005–2010, 10.
88. USAID, USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnian Reconstruction Program, 25.
89. Ibid., 24.
90. To argue that the situation for women in Afghanistan was worse than for women in Bosnia does not dismiss the fact that there were very serious difficulties for
women in Bosnia. For a detailed breakdown of the impact of Bosnian society’s attitudes to women see Women for Women International, *Report on Bosnia-Herzegovina*.

For a comprehensive list of details regarding the plight of women in Afghanistan go to the country page at the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN). http://www.irinnews.org/Asia-Country.aspx?Country=AFG.

95. USAID, *USAID/Afghanistan Program Overview Fact Sheet*.
100. *Ibid*.
102. Carothers, ‘Democracy, State and AID’.
103. See Talento, ‘The Two Faces of Nation-Building’, 562–3. Talento comments that the first wave of democratizations with an interdependent democratic institutional framework and culture took centuries to develop. Also see Mandelbaum, ‘Democracy Without America’, 119–30. According to Mandelbaum, it takes at least a generation for the ‘social conditions conducive to liberty’ to develop in a contemporary democratization (123).
105. *Ibid*.
108. *Ibid*.
111. UN, ‘Ongoing Insecurity Hampering Humanitarian Efforts in Afghanistan’.
112. In an interview with the author, Gerald Hyman, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies, supported this point. He commented on civilian workers such as those at USAID working within the PRT system: ‘They are embedded […] in a military fort all around the country, and they can barely get out, barely do any work […] security force is not as great as it should be probably, and they’ve got multiple missions of which building civilian institutions is one of them, but not the only one, the other one is beat the Taliban and secure the country. […] if you’ve got to go out in a convoy every time you meet a mayor […] the convoy’s got to have shooters up front and so on and so on to protect you […] otherwise you are potentially going to get killed. If […] that is the model then that is an opportunity cost that has to be taken by every commander to move assets to protect you instead of to go and do something else. Ok, in a security environment like that what are the options? How much energy is going to be spent doing the provincial reconstruction stuff?’ Interview with Gerald Hyman, Washington DC, 31 May 2007.
113. The world’s most powerful states include ‘the Contact Group of the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, and leading international institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United Nations, OSCE and NATO’. Chandler, *Bosnia Faking Democracy After Dayton*, 2.


117. IFES, Internews, NED (National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute), International City Managers Association, Emerging Markets Group, Ltd., New York University, Chemonics International Inc., Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Rescue Committee (IRC), and Save the Children UK in Bosnia, and Save the Children Federation, Inc. in Afghanistan. In order not to skew perception of the results, an organization is mentioned only once in this study but it could have multiple projects in the same or different areas operating at the same time. Findings come from unpublished research; please contact me for details.

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