

Black-Majority Districts or Black Influence Districts?
Evaluating the Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Substantive Representation of African-Americans in Black-Majority and Black Influence Districts in the Wake of *Georgia v. Ashcroft*

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- Section 5, “4. Broad questions of electoral representation”— addressing questions such as “Should the VRA continue to protect and encourage the formation of majority-minority districts?” and “What are the comparative benefits of directing section 5 enforcement toward the goal of (1) descriptive representation; (2) substantive representation, or (3) enhancing the ‘ability to participate in the process,’ more broadly?”

Abstract:

What causes legislators to represent the substantive needs of black constituents in their districts as measured by roll-call voting *as well as through distributive policy-making*? Are legislators who are African-American more likely to reach out to black constituents than other legislators? Are legislators from black-majority or from black “influence” districts more likely to reach out to and effectively represent black constituents? Specifically, this research determines the effect of (1) electing black representatives; and (2) drawing black-majority districts or black influence districts on the substantive representation of black constituents. Few scholars have disentangled the separate effects of these factors. Also unlike previous researchers, these questions are answered by examining different modes of substantive representation in Congress: roll-call voting and federal “pork” project allocation. Quantitative analyses from districts in the 104th-106th Congresses (supplemented with interviews) are conducted to examine project allocation. Analyses from the 1970s and 1990s are conducted to examine civil rights policy change in Congress. The findings are as follows: (1) civil rights policy outcomes in the U.S. House have changed little between the 1970s and 1990s, and thus studying distributive policy decisions such as federal project allocation are preferable when assessing black-majority versus black influence districts and the effect of descriptive representation; (2) descriptive representation yields substantive representation in Congress, when measured as federal project allocation to black constituents. To increase the substantive representation of black interests as measured by the delivery of goods and services to black constituents, the best predictor is the election of black legislators. Specifically, the “best” district for achieving substantive representation of African-American voters is a black influence district where a black legislator is able to achieve victory. Thus, I argue that a combination of black-majority districts ($\geq 50\%$ black) and black influence districts (see *Georgia v. Ashcroft*) that are 40-49% black (depending on the local context and the extent of racially polarized voting) should be suggested in redistricting plans when enforcing section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

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When asked to rank the most important activity that members of Congress engage in, 47 percent of African-Americans chose “making sure the district gets its fair share of government money and projects” (Tate 2003). In contrast, only 15 percent of all U.S. citizens think this is a representative’s most important responsibility.¹ Given the value that black Americans place on the delivery of projects, we would expect that scholars studying voting rights and minority representation would have addressed this topic. However, most scholars have only addressed the effect of black representation on roll-call voting. In fact, to my knowledge, no scholar has examined the impact of racial representation on the distribution of “pork” projects to black constituents.

In this paper, I answer four questions: (1) Is examining civil rights policy-making on the House floor or is examining distributive policymaking (“pork” project allocation) for African-Americans the best gauge of the efficacy of black-majority versus black influence districts? (2) Do representatives elected from majority-black districts allocate more federal projects to black constituents than representatives from other districts? (3) Do black representatives allocate more projects to black constituents than white representatives? And (4) do Democratic representatives allocate more projects to black constituents than Republican representatives? The four primary findings are as follows. First, I show that civil rights policy outcomes in the U.S. House have changed little between the 1970s and the 1990s, and thus studying distributive policy decisions such as federal project allocation—where legislative coalitions may be universal—are preferable when assessing the efficacy of black-majority versus black influence districts. Second, when examining the allocation of federal “pork” projects to African-Americans, the election of black legislators enhances the substantive representation of black interests: black

¹ This result for all U.S. citizens is from Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987, 38). The question was the same in the Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina study (NES) as the Tate study (NBES).

representatives are more likely than white representatives to allocate projects to black constituents, all else being equal.

Third, in just the subset of districts *represented by black legislators*, black-majority districts do not enhance the substantive representation of black interests: black representatives elected from black influence or coalitional districts allocate more projects to black constituents than do black representatives from majority-black districts. Thus, in order to maximize the number of projects allocated to black constituents, *black influence districts where black candidates can win may be the best prescription. Further, black-majority districts that elect black legislators are preferable to black influence districts represented by nonblack legislators if the goal is to enhance African-American voting strength.* These results imply that *Georgia v. Ashcroft's* conclusion that black influence districts are acceptable avenues to enhance minority voting strength is partially incorrect.

This paper is organized as follows. First, I explain why the debate over the effect of (1) majority-black versus black influence districts; and (2) Republican versus Democratic legislators is overblown when we examine the ideological locations of members of the U.S. House in the aggregate. Second, I show that the 218th vote in the U.S. House—the decisive legislator—has not shifted ideologically on civil rights regardless of whether Congress is controlled by Democrats or Republicans; whether black-majority districts or black influence districts predominate in state redistricting plans; or whether the Congress is the 93rd (1973-74) or the 104th (1995-96). Third, I explain why it is useful to examine the distribution of projects within districts—a universal legislative policy activity—instead of examining roll call voting. Fourth, I explain how I will track the distribution of projects to black constituents within congressional districts. Fifth, I hypothesize that both the presence of a black representative and a black-majority district will increase the likelihood of black constituents receiving federal projects. Sixth, I present the data and methods used to test these hypotheses. Seventh, I explain the results, focusing particularly on the importance of the presence of a black representative in a district and the black population of a district. Finally, I raise further questions and discuss conclusions regarding minority representation and federal project distribution in the wake of *Georgia v. Ashcroft*. I argue that black influence districts where black

legislators are very likely to win are useful goals of voting rights advocates. However, black-majority districts are preferable to black influence districts if black legislators are not likely to win in black influence districts.

**Black-majority or Black Influence Districts? Black Legislators or White Legislators?
A Solution to the Puzzle of Minority Representation by Moving Beyond Roll-Call Voting**

This paper addresses a puzzle in the literature on minority representation. If we are interested in questions about American democracy and concerned about how best to enhance minority representation, is it important to elect black representatives? What arrangement of black voters in a district maximizes the representation of black interests via public policy (black influence districts as suggested by cases such as *Georgia v. Ashcroft* or black-majority districts as suggested by the Voting Rights Act extensions of 1982)? Scholars have not given a clear answer.

Early literature on the subject focuses on the need for enhanced descriptive representation—defined as the election of black representatives to office (Davidson and Grofman 1994; Parker 1990). These scholars argue that policy or substantive representation is more likely to reflect “black interests” if black-majority districts are drawn. They also suggest that the election of black officials is needed in order to enhance substantive black representation.

A second wave of studies, though, questions the efficacy of drawing black-majority districts (Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996; Guinier 1994; Lublin 1997; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997; Whitby 1997). These scholars find that the creation of black-majority districts leads to “better” representation of black constituents only in those districts with black majorities; in the aggregate, however, these districts actually hurt black interests by packing black voters into a small number of districts. Others have raised serious questions about the need to elect blacks to office, claiming that the importance of race in policy-making is declining (Thernstrom 1987; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997). The most recent work, though, has contradicted these claims, finding that black-majority districts are likely to create more pro-African-American outcomes in the legislature as a whole (Shotts 2002, 2003a, 2003b). Further, recent scholarship has indicated that black descriptive representation provides benefits

for black voters through both roll-call voting and through enhanced participation among black voters relative to white voters (Canon 1999; Gay 2001, 2002; Tate 2003; Haynie 2001; Whitby 1997).

So, what do we make of these contradictory conclusions? One reason for this lack of consensus is that scholars are studying the same concept (African-American representation), but not addressing the fact that members of Congress engage in multiple activities. Where one scholar finds a deleterious effect when examining one set of roll-call votes, another points to just the opposite when looking at a different subset of votes. In order to see which, if any, of the above competing theories of black representation are accurate, I look at representational behavior beyond roll-call voting. By looking at other representational activities such as “pork barrelling,” a clearer picture of this scholarly and policy debate will emerge.

Further, I argue that the focus on roll-call vote outcomes in the aggregate is inappropriate as the civil rights voting record of the median legislator in Congress has changed little in the last few decades. Scholars should instead examine policy-making that is not as zero-sum as a “yea” or “nay” roll call in order to best assess the value of (1) black-majority districts versus black influence districts; and (2) whether descriptive representation is an important predictor of beneficial outcomes for African-Americans in Congress.

Civil Rights and the Median Legislator: Why Racial Gerrymandering’s Effect on Aggregate Policy-making is Not that Important

Even if states are required to maximize majority-minority districts, they are limited by geography and demography. Thus, the districts drawn for the 1992 elections likely represent the highest number of majority-minority districts geographically possible unless the demographics of the United States shift extensively. In the 104th Congress, for instance, only 32 of the 435 congressional districts in the U.S. House had a black population of 50 percent or greater. If all of these lead to dilutive effects in surrounding districts—then perhaps 60 to 90 districts of 435 are affected by black-majority maximization requirements. While this is a large number, it is still not the bulk of congressional districts in the United States—more than 80 percent of the House members will ultimately be elected from districts that are drawn with no bearing on African-American gerrymandering.

For instance, in Alabama, a black-majority district was created in 1992 (the 7th district). Scholars have noted that the surrounding district (6th district) that had been represented by Ben Erdreich (D-AL) became heavily white, diluting black voting strength by placing most of Birmingham's black community in the newly created 7th district. Lublin and Voss (2003) note that Erdreich was replaced by a conservative Republican. However, the 1992 congressional district re-map of Alabama only substantially affected districts 6 and 7 and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th districts' lines were only slightly adjusted. Thus, the requirement to draw a black-majority district in Alabama may have caused Erdreich to lose, but this is only one congressional district of 435: one district becoming more conservative is likely a drop in the bucket when we aggregate policy outcomes to the House as a whole.

Essentially, my argument is that scholars' obsession with roll-call voting outcomes in a few state delegations misses the broader point of how policy is made on the floor of Congress. Because the bulk of U.S. state's congressional districting plans do not require preclearance, the median legislator in the U.S. House is unlikely to change dramatically with the addition—or subtraction—of a few black-majority districts in the states that are covered by section 5. Further, this suggests that the debate over black-majority versus black influence districts and whether descriptive representation affects policy outcomes is relatively unimportant once we examine aggregate policy outcomes in Congress. When we consider legislators' policy preferences from states without racial redistricting imperatives in conjunction with legislators' policy preferences in states where racial redistricting was required by the Voting Rights Act, the aggregate policy outcomes in Congress are likely to be dominated by the large supermajority of legislators hailing from states without racial gerrymandering.

As scholars of the spatial model of voting in legislatures note, there are certain pivotal legislators in Congress that can dominate policy outcomes (Krehbiel 2000). In the U.S. House, where 218 of 435 votes are required to pass legislation on the floor, the median legislator—the 218th legislator—on a left-right issue dimension is the critical legislator for determining roll-call outcomes in the legislature as a whole. Racial redistricting scholars have tended to focus on a few state delegations, instead of assessing the policy outcome in Congress as a whole based on the location of the median legislator. Shotts (2002,

2003a) is the only scholar who has used the logic of the spatial theory of voting in analyzing racial representation and he finds that majority-minority districts may move policy outcomes to the left under some conditions. However, Shotts (2003a, 2003b) also notes that majority-minority districts may also move policy outcomes to the right in the aggregate legislature under other conditions (e.g., in nonsouthern states with liberal voter preferences). Contrary to Shotts, Lublin and Voss (2003) argue that racial redistricting and black-majority districts will shift the median legislator in Congress to the right.

However, no one has empirically examined the ideological positions of members of the House on the ideological dimension of civil rights. The debate between Shotts (2003a, 2003b) and Lublin and Voss (2003) has examined how black-majority districts cause shifts leftward and rightward generally on all issues (using Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) NOMINATE scores). However, Canon (1999), Swain (1995), and Tate (2003) have noted that African-American voter preferences are not consistently liberal on public policy. In fact, there is great diversity of public opinion within the black community and thus using general left-right ideological measures of policy outcomes in Congress may not be the best proxy for policies in the interest of African-Americans. Canon (1999) and Tate (2003) note that African-American voters do, in fact, have distinct—and more liberal—policy preferences on civil rights issues than white Americans. Thus, I will use estimates of the ideological positions of members of Congress on just civil rights issues to determine if the median legislator in Congress has changed over time.

I estimate the civil rights issue space in the 93rd Congress (1973-1974), the 102nd Congress (1991-92), the 103rd Congress (1993-94), and the 104th Congress (1995-96). I use Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to estimate ideal points on civil rights votes on the floor of the House during these Congresses. For technical details regarding the estimation process, please see Grose (n.d.). These ideological estimates use a method very similar to that used by Martin and Quinn (2002) and Martin, Quinn, and Epstein (2005) to estimate the ideological positions of Supreme Court Justices over time based on their revealed preferences in votes on the Court. They are also similar to methods used to analyze congressional voting (e.g., Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Poole 2005).

The estimation is based on civil rights votes of members of Congress during these Congresses.² These civil rights ideal point estimates are comparable across time periods and vary over time for legislators who serve over multiple Congresses.³ Thus, if a legislator serving in the 102nd Congress continues to serve in the 103rd and 104th, we can examine the point estimate of their ideological location in the civil rights issue space to determine if they became more liberal or more conservative when voting on civil rights.

Thus, we can assess whether the positions of legislators change over time. If maximizing black-majority districts in 1992 led to more conservative aggregate policy outcomes on civil rights in the legislature (as argued by Lublin and Voss 2003) or if maximizing black-majority districts in 1992 led to more liberal aggregate policy outcomes (as argued by Shotts 2003a), we can examine whether (a) the location of the median House member; and (b) the distribution of legislator preferences on civil rights has changed between the 102nd, 103rd, and 104th Congresses. The 102nd Congress (1991-92) was controlled by Democrats, but the new majority-minority districts in “covered” states had yet to be drawn. The 103rd Congress (1993-94) was also controlled by Democrats, but the covered states now had legislators elected from many more black-majority districts following redistricting in 1992. The 104th Congress (1995-96) was controlled by Republicans and still retained numerous black-majority districts in covered states. Thus, by examining the ideological locations of legislators during these Congresses, a natural experiment can be conducted to assess whether the legislators’ preferences on civil rights in the aggregate legislature shifted dramatically. I also examine the 93rd Congress (1973-74) as a baseline comparison when Congress was not known to be particularly liberal on civil rights.

² Again, see Grose (n.d.) for details. The civil rights votes were selected using the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) key civil rights votes over time. Instead of simply using the LCCR supplied scores, though, my estimation method is much more nuanced. For instance, a legislator who voted against an amendment supported by the LCCR because it may weaken other legislation the LCCR preferred would receive a lower score from the LCCR. However, there are occasional votes and amendments not supported by the LCCR that are actually very liberal on civil rights. Thus, by using my scaling method instead of LCCR votes, we are able to find that some legislators are actually to the left of the LCCR. Mel Watt (D-NC), for instance, had a voting record to the left of the LCCR during the 104th Congress (Watt was more pro-civil rights than the LCCR).

³ I am able to estimate these ideal points over time by putting relatively tight priors on bill locations. Again, for technical details, please see Grose (n.d.). Also the position of the LCCR at -1 is fixed and the position of Phil Crane at +1 is fixed for his career (a Republican with an almost 0 percent lifetime LCCR voting record who served in the 93rd, 102nd, 103rd, and 104th Congresses).

Is the civil right issue space more liberal or conservative with majority-minority districts?

Figures 1 through 4 display kernel densities of the ideological distributions of all House members in the 93rd, 102nd, 103rd, and 104th Congresses. An immediate pattern stands out: while the number of legislators in each “hump” has changed over time (and thus the density in each figure is taller or lumpier), there are three “humps” during this entire time period on civil rights. Negative numbers are liberal positions on civil rights issues, while positive numbers are conservative positions on civil rights issues (on the x-axis). Against the conventional wisdom, while the shape of the distribution of legislators’ policy preferences on civil rights has changed over time, the location of the median legislator has barely moved. Further, polarization seen in the modern Congress on other issues is not seen when examining only civil rights voting preferences.

FIGURES 1 THROUGH 4 HERE

Statistically, the position of the median—or middle, decisive legislator—has not changed between the 1973-74 session of Congress and the 1995-96 session of Congress. As noted in Figures 1 through 4, the median legislator on the civil rights issue dimension on the floor of the House in the 93rd Congress (1973-74) is at -0.035; the median in the 102nd Congress (1991-92) is at -0.056, the median in the 103rd Congress (1993-94) is at -0.085, and the median in the 104th Congress (1995-96) is at 0.151. While this shows a slight rightward shift (positive values are conservative) between the 103rd and 104th, the point estimates are statistically indistinguishable.⁴

Further, perhaps surprising to some, there are a number of House members in 1990s Congresses who were just as conservative on civil rights as segregationist members of Congress who served during the 1973-74 session (93rd Congress). For instance, in the 102^d Congress, then-Congressman Rick Santorum (R-PA) was located on the far right on civil rights (though not in a pivotal position to affect policy outcomes) at 1.037. This is statistically similar to the civil rights ideal point estimates for a

⁴ The 95 percent Highest Posterior Density (HPD) regions of the point estimates of the median in the 103rd and 104th Congress showed that these median legislators (Pete Peterson in the 103rd at -0.085 and Chris Smith in the 104th Congress at 0.151) were not distinguishable in terms of their ideological location along the civil rights issue dimension.

number of boll weevil Democrats who during the 93rd Congress (1973-74) opposed voting rights and civil rights legislation: Jamie Whitten (D-MS1) at 1.098; Sonny Montgomery (D-MS3) at 1.099; and Joseph Waggoner (D-LA4) at 0.99. However, while there are very conservative members of the House on civil rights in the 1990s era as well as in the early 1970s, the pivotal legislator is the median. This legislator over more than twenty years has consistently been a moderate on civil rights legislation.⁵

Based on this evidence, it is clear that the extensive debate over the efficacy of majority-minority districts on civil rights policy outcomes is unnecessary. Whether districting plans maximize black populations in a handful of black-majority districts or whether districting plans spread black voters out in a number of black “influence” districts is irrelevant to civil rights policy locations in the legislature (e.g., the 102nd Congress plan included many plans with influence districts, while the 103rd Congress included some states with black-majority maximization plans). Even when we examine a situation where Republicans controlled the legislature under a scenario with numerous black-majority districts (the 104th Congress), the median legislator in Congress as a whole has only slightly become more conservative on civil rights based on point estimates—and when we consider the 95% HPD regions—the median legislator in the Republican-controlled 104th Congress is statistically indistinguishable from the median legislator in the Democratically-controlled 103rd Congress.⁶

Examining the distributions of legislators’ ideological locations between the 103rd and 104th Congresses does reveal what most scholars have already noted. That the number (and density) of conservative legislators increased. However, this peak is very skinny, and the density of legislators hovering near the 0 location in Figure 4 is also quite large. Thus, while more conservative Republicans on civil rights were clearly elected to this Congress, because of offsetting ideological locations from Democrats from majority-minority districts and from other legislators elected in districting plans from states not covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the median legislator on civil rights is still very moderate.

⁵ I have also estimated comparable estimates of civil rights preferences for other Congresses, but I chose to focus on these four Congresses for the sake of parsimony and because they present a natural experiment.

⁶ I do not consider how majority party medians have shifted here, though this should be examined in future work.

Remarkably, the ideological location of legislators on civil rights has only marginally changed between the early 1970s and the early 1990s—and regardless of whether black influence districts or majority-black districts predominate—and regardless of whether Republicans or Democrats control the House. Thus, returning to my initial argument that scholars need to examine policy-making that is more universal in nature than roll-call votes on the floor of the House, I turn to a different measure of substantive representation of African-American interests.

Federal Pork Projects: A New Measure of Policy Representation

As detailed above, the study of roll-call voting has been the bread-and-butter of scholars of both Congress and minority representation, yet the importance of congressional roll calls has been overstated by voting rights scholars when assessing districting plans. However, some congressional scholars (Cain, Ferejohn, Fiorina 1987; Fenno 1978; Hall 1996) have addressed other facets of legislative representation beyond the vote. Only a few scholars of minority representation, both empirical (Canon 1999; Sinclair-Chapman 2000; Swain 1995) and normative (Mansbridge 1999; Williams 1998), have begun to consider other ways of conceptualizing substantive or policy representation. Moving beyond policy representation, Tate (2003) and Gay (2001, 2002) have examined symbolic representation and political participation.

I extend the study of substantive representation and racial redistricting in a new direction by focusing on *distributive* public policy. I analyze the distribution of federal “pork” projects within congressional districts in order to capture manifestations of policy representation beyond roll-call voting. “Pork” projects are likely to be of importance to constituents in ways that voting on bills may not be. Tangible goods delivered to the district are important for legislators hoping to establish and expand personal connections within their districts.

Another advantage of studying the distribution of projects is that I am measuring legislative policy outputs of the type that are not typically based on ideology. Distributive policy outputs (or “pork” projects) are much more likely to be passed by an overwhelming margin on the House floor than other more ideologically-driven legislation that may be favored by black constituents, such as redistributive policies or social policies (e.g., affirmative action, civil rights, liberal economic policies). Unlike voting

on ideological policy, distributive politics is not always a zero-sum game between legislators of different parties (Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). By this, I mean that legislators often form large coalitions spanning party and ideology to support project delivery. Thus, individual legislators have the ability to garner projects and give them to multiple constituencies, while with roll-call voting they must cast either “yea” or “nay.”

Also, congressional staff that I interviewed suggested that they have much greater control over their ability to deliver projects to constituents of their choosing than with roll-call voting. I asked all staff I interviewed for this project whether their congressional office seeks out grants from voters or whether they simply help with requests for applications. One staffer from Sanford Bishop’s (D-GA) office, Hobby Stripling, said that a substantial portion (though not all) of his offices’ assistance with project grants occurs based upon constituents’ unsolicited requests: “We don’t have to look for much business.” Other staffers, though, indicated that they seek out projects for constituents, especially strong supporters. Tracey Lovett, a staffer in David Price’s (D-NC) district office said that “it’s a little bit of both [responding to constituents’ project requests and seeking out constituents to apply for grants].” An example she offered was Price’s work to encourage the continuation of funding for a program called the “Saturday Academy” at N.C. Central University, a historically black college in Durham, North Carolina. This program brings in African-American elementary and middle-school students to the university on the weekends for practice in taking standardized tests. Price was attending an event at the university one Saturday, and learned about the program while there. According to Lovett, he encouraged the program’s administrators to apply for a federal grant for the program, saying he ““would hate to see this fall through the cracks.”” Thus, legislators both encourage grant applications from constituents who may not be aware of federal opportunities for funding, while also assisting those constituents who come directly to them. Given this pattern, it is likely a legislator’s race may play a role in project allocation to black constituents.

Predominately Black Counties as Proxy Measures for Black Constituents

My goal is to measure the distribution of federal projects to black constituents within congressional districts. However, it is impossible to chart the flow of individual projects to each

individual recipient by race.⁷ Thus, a proxy unit of analysis for black constituents is required. Due to residential and historical segregation in many parts of the U.S., members of individual racial groups are highly concentrated in some geographical areas. In this section, I look at one of these geographical subunits, counties within congressional districts. Specifically, I look at counties with significant black populations in order to capture the flow of federal projects to black constituents. While this is not a perfect surrogate measure of black constituents, it does have appeal, given what we know about how members of Congress view and compartmentalize their own districts.⁸

Many representatives regard counties as “building blocks” that make up their overall geographic constituency. Kathy Worthington, a staff member for former Representative Mark Sanford (R-SC), explained how Sanford regarded his district: she immediately divided up the district, county by county, detailing which county’s residents were most likely to support Sanford. In fact, she mentioned one particular county that was visited less often than others when Sanford returned home on weekends and recesses. The explanations offered were that its population was small and that Sanford’s support was particularly weak there, given the county’s large proportion of black constituents. It was clear from this exchange that Sanford (or at least his staffer) intertwined county-based geography and race when thinking about the district.

In this section, I will look at the distribution of projects within congressional districts to those counties that have very high levels of black population. To capture the distribution of projects to black constituents, there are some obvious criteria to use when determining which counties to look at. Counties with substantial black populations are clearly of interest. Thus, I will estimate models with a sample of counties from all congressional districts in the 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses (1995-2000). Specifically, I examine counties that are greater than 40 percent in black population in all congressional districts during these three Congresses.

⁷ Perhaps other scholars in the future can conduct such a study. Surveys of those recipients of projects could be conducted in order to learn which individual constituents receive projects and what impact this might have on opinions of their representatives.

⁸ Other researchers also have examined the delivery of projects to geographic constituencies within congressional districts (Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder 2002).

Data Variance Problems in Previous Work on African-American Representation

Why are cross-sectional data including these court-ordered districts so useful? The data are useful because previous researchers have not had enough variation in their samples to test competing theories. Scholars have made broad conclusions regarding the size of the African-American district population and the effect of a legislator's race and party on congressional vote outcomes. However, those who have tried to divine the differential effects of (1) electing black legislators and (2) the overall black population of districts on the substantive representation of black constituents typically run into a methodological "brick wall": multicollinearity. Until recently, nearly every black legislator was elected from a majority-black district. As a result, the correlation between these two variables was typically so high (> 0.9) that quantitative scholars have been forced to choose just one variable to include in models. Whitby and Krause (2001, 561) have called this problem a "dilemma [that] hampers all other research on this topic."

Multicollinearity is typically a problem in that it causes standard errors between correlated variables to become inflated even when the variables may in fact be significant. In fact, the "so-called multicollinearity problem" is simply a problem of sample size and of lack of variation among observations, as Achen (1982) has stated: [M]ulti-collinearity violates no regression assumptions. Unbiased, consistent estimates will occur.... The only effect of multicollinearity is to make it harder to get coefficient estimates with small standard errors." Previous scholars examining racial representation in Congress have faced this problem in part because the number of observations has been small (in some analyses), but for the most part simply due to the lack of variation that has historically existed between these two key independent variables (race of legislator and black district population).

Methodologically, by examining counties during the 104th through 106th Congresses, I am able to overcome this multicollinearity problem that has seriously hampered past scholars examining racial representation. The data and research design allow for inferences to be drawn about the effects of the race of the legislators, the black populations of the districts, and the party of the legislators in the same statistical model. The time period of the 104th-106th Congresses (1995-2000), in which I examine federal

project allocation, includes a substantial number of black legislators elected from districts without a black majority in order to reduce this multicollinearity problem (many black legislators were reelected in white-majority/black influence districts following court-ordered redistricting in the wake of cases such as *Miller v. Johnson*). For a more extensive discussion of how these congressional district data from 1995-2000 provide leverage on examining the effect of both the race of the legislator (descriptive representation) and the district black population (black-majority versus black influence districts), see Grose (2005).⁹

One additional point needs to be made about the unit of analysis. Above, I simply use the word “counties.” However, in order to utilize more complete data, I also include those counties that are split into multiple congressional districts. Thus, the above measures include both whole counties and portions of counties. When I refer to “counties”, I also include county portions that are split between congressional districts. However, for the sake of parsimony, I typically refer to all as “counties” throughout the paper.

Table 1 details the incidence of black representatives in congressional districts with varying levels of black population.¹⁰ While there is obviously an asymmetry between the race of the representative and the district black population, the inclusion of districts redrawn due to court order will help reduce the multicollinearity between these two variables so that estimation can at least be attempted. For example, in the sample of counties that are at least 40 percent black in population, 70 counties are represented by a legislator of a different racial background than the majority of the constituents in the district (these are indicated in bold). This is much better than many previous studies with almost no black

⁹ The correlation between the *black district population* and *black legislator* variables is high: 0.8. However, this is much lower than past studies where the correlation between these variables is well over 0.9. Demonstrating reduced levels of correlation does not fully demonstrate that multicollinearity is not present. Thus, we also conduct a diagnostic test of multicollinearity (examining the variance inflation factors, or VIFs, of all variables in the analyses) and multicollinearity was not detected. VIF values above 10 indicate high levels of multicollinearity (Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price, 2000). The values of the VIFs for all variables I discuss in the next section are lower than 10, and thus multicollinearity is not a serious problem (especially given the large sample size by looking at counties as the unit of analysis). The variance inflation factors (VIFs) were just above 5 for both the black legislator variable and the district black population variable (discussed fully in the next section).

¹⁰ Unfortunately, data for many of the independent variables related to the 106th Congress in North Carolina and Virginia congressional districts are not available, and thus counties from districts in these two states for the 106th Congress were excluded from the analysis. Following the 1998 elections these states were forced to redraw their districts. In three of the districts, black representatives were redrawn into much whiter districts. The inclusion of these data could potentially reduce multicollinearity even more.

legislators representing districts without black majorities in their samples. Clearly, the variation caused by the election of African-American legislators in districts without black majorities is increased by expanding the sample size when the unit of analysis is the county.

TABLE 1 HERE

Hypotheses: The Effect of Racial Representation on Federal Project Allocations

To determine whether (1) black-majority districts versus black influence districts; (2) descriptive representation; and (3) political party affect distributive policy outcomes, I examine the effect of these factors on “pork” project allocation to these heavily black counties. These factors are likely to have an impact on the substantive representation of black constituents and below I briefly detail how we might expect these variables to affect project allocation to African-American constituents.

We know from the Congress literature that the size of particular constituency groups within a district affects the representative’s responsiveness to that group. In order to secure reelection, a member of Congress cannot neglect large groups of voters within the district. Others studying roll-call voting have found that the black population of a district leads to a more pro-civil rights voting record in Congress at the level of the individual district. Taking this logic to the level of distributive policy projects, I expect that the larger the black constituency is in a district, the more likely that the district’s representative will allocate projects to counties with substantial black populations.

Representatives who want to appeal broadly to black voters can do so by giving projects to counties that are predominately black. Jim Clyburn, who has represented South Carolina’s black-majority 6th district since 1992, is an example of what to expect based on this hypothesis. Serving on the Transportation committee during the 105th Congress, he included many projects for his district in the committee’s final authorization bill. Clyburn was asked about these “pork” projects by an interviewer, and his response is illuminating (Duncan and Nutting 1999, 1239):

[Black constituents in my district] have been historically neglected....I do not take kindly to efforts to improve their quality of life being labeled pork....These [small, black] counties don’t have the numbers. They don’t have the political clout.

Although he bristled at the label “pork” given by the interviewer, it is clear from his response that Clyburn both directed projects toward black constituents and that he conceived of his black constituency in political-geographic terms. The question remains whether Clyburn’s actions are more generalizable to other legislators from districts with large black populations.

Alternatively, perhaps Clyburn was not motivated by the size of his black constituency as much as his own racial background (e.g., Whitby 1997). Clyburn is South Carolina’s first black legislator since Reconstruction, and his presence in office may also predict his focus on the delivery of projects to black constituents, regardless of the demographics of the district. Thus, I hypothesize that African-American legislators are more likely to deliver a larger number of projects to heavily black counties.

Third, in addition to examining the impact of the district black population and the presence of a black legislator, I also hypothesize that the interaction of these two variables will predict “pork” project allocations to black constituents. I term this interactive effect “racial trust.” The idea here is that white legislators may be more responsive than black legislators once the district black population becomes very large. That is, due to the lack of a shared racial background, trust of white legislators will be lower among black constituents compared to black legislators, and thus white legislators will need to engage in activity that indicates to black constituents that they care about black voters. Thus the interaction of the race of the legislator and the district black population may also have an independent effect on project delivery outcomes. Further, Swain (1995) has shown that black legislators from supermajority black districts have less of an incentive to work extensively on constituency service and other activities geared toward the district compared to black legislators from more competitive districts. Thus this variable is included based on the expectation that black legislators from districts with fewer black constituents may be more likely to allocate projects than their African-American counterparts from heavily-black districts.

Finally, it is expected that Republicans will be less likely to reward those who do not support them, and thus are likely to deliver fewer projects to heavily black counties than Democrats. Since black voters have historically been unlikely to support Republican congressional candidates, it is also unlikely that Republican legislators will work extensively to distribute projects to African-American constituents.

Jay Dickey, a Republican who served the 4th district of Arkansas from 1993-2001, was caught admitting as much when speaking before a group of black farmers in his district. Dickey was asked why he did not secure more federal projects for black constituents in his district. His response was surprisingly blunt, but may characterize what many congressional Republicans are afraid to utter publicly:

You want us to take away from projects that serve our base and give it to people who not only don't vote for you but who work for your defeat? It's a miracle I can get anything done for them [black farmers].¹¹

If this statement is applicable to other members of Congress, then we should expect Democrats to reward black voters with higher levels of projects, while Republicans will not, since black constituents are rarely part of their electoral coalitions. Alternatively, other Republican legislators may not be as hostile to black constituents as Dickey was, but given that black constituents are usually not part of Republican electoral coalitions, it is still likely that Republicans will allocate fewer projects to black constituents.

Data and Methods

The data used in this part of the analysis for the dependent variable are from the Federal Awards Assistance Data System (FAADS). Other details regarding the unit of analysis were given earlier. However, more information about the data in both samples of counties is needed before we proceed to the analysis. The FAADS data are available from the U.S. census bureau as a list of every project allocated with associated geographic information. I began the data collection with the entire data set of all projects sent to all congressional districts in the 104th-106th Congresses and selected only those projects allocated to heavily-black counties (≥ 40 percent black counties). Then, I excluded all types of federal assistance other than project grants—formula-based grants, loans, contingent financial aid, and so on were not included. Project grants are the most likely to be “pork” where legislators are able to control their distribution to particular constituencies (Stein and Bickers 1995). Next, I aggregated these data to each

¹¹ This statement, from George (2000, A1), caused a subsequent firestorm, hurting Dickey more than he may have anticipated. After extensive media attention and criticism, Dickey finally made peace with the black farmers' group and even sponsored legislation to assist black farmers in the district. It is unlikely that he would have sponsored this legislation, though, had he not made such an embarrassing public statement. Dickey lost his 2000 reelection bid.

county so that the *total number of projects* allocated to each county was known. Finally, I collected independent variables associated with each of these counties, their districts, and their representatives.

I only look at the final year of each session (1996, 1998, and 2000) for two reasons. First, “pork” projects may have a greater effect during election years.¹² Second, there is a lag between the time when a project is actually approved by Congress and when it is processed. Thus, it would be difficult to distinguish whether project data in early 1999, for example, was a result of maneuverings of the legislator elected to the district in November 1996 or of the legislator elected in November 1998.¹³

Modelling the Effect of Racial Representation on Project Allocations to Black Constituents

As mentioned above, I measure “pork” projects by looking at the total number of projects allocated to a particular county. The dependent variable in each model is the *number of new federal project grants allocated*. The number of projects, instead of dollar outlays, is the most appropriate measure (Stein and Bickers 1995).¹⁴ The actual projects themselves are more likely to be remembered by constituents than are the aggregate totals of funding for each project grant. Similarly, maximizing the actual number of projects is likely to be the most politically important aspect to a member of Congress. Thus, consistent with previous research (e.g., Stein and Bickers 1995), the number of projects is the best measure since I am interested in capturing representatives’ political objectives.¹⁵

¹² Anagnoson (1982), for example, finds the electoral impact of projects to be greatest when they are announced near an election period.

¹³ The data used are a count of the number of projects allocated. Ideally, we could chart each individual project given to each recipient by race, but this is not possible. The next best alternative is the data at hand, which are the total number of projects allocated to each county in a particular year. Thus the use of OLS may be inappropriate, and a non-linear event count model is needed. For these reasons, I estimate the model with the negative binomial distribution. The negative binomial regression model relaxes the assumption of constant mean and variance across observations that is required for a Poisson distribution (see Greene 1997, 941-942; King 1989, 51-54; and Long 1997, 230-38 for more information on the negative binomial regression model). I have hypothesized and past research indicates (Stein and Bickers 1995) that projects are not distributed equally: legislators attempt to reward supporters with projects. Additionally, the number of new projects allocated depends in part on demand in each county based on such variables as overall population, economic need, and the like (Rich 1989). Thus, the assumption of constant variance and mean required of the Poisson model will be difficult to meet and the negative binomial model is the most theoretically appropriate specification. Also, the models are estimated controlling for heteroscedasticity (using the “cluster” command in Stata, denoting each year of analysis).

¹⁴ However, in analyses not presented here, I have also examined the impact of these variables on dollar amounts allocated and the results are very similar.

¹⁵ The need to include portions of counties does not allow us to have precise measures of allocations to these portions. The FAADS data set only details which counties receive projects, not which portions of counties within

Independent variables of interest: racial representation variables

Four variables are needed to test the hypotheses. The first one is the *black population of the district*, included to test the first hypothesis. This variable is simply the percentage of the population that is black according to 1990 census figures.¹⁶ In the sample of counties with a 40 percent black population or higher, the minimum value for this district variable is 11 (three counties in the sample are represented by a legislator from an 11 percent black district) and the maximum value is 74 percent black (3 counties).

Black representative. To test the second hypothesis, which addresses the effects of descriptive representation on the allocation of federal projects, I include a dummy variable. It is coded “1” for all counties that are represented by a black legislator and coded “0” for all counties with nonblack legislators. Three counties are represented by a Latino legislator (Jose Serrano from New York’s 16th district).

Racial trust. This variable is the interaction of the district black population and the race of the representative and is specified in order to test the third hypothesis. I expect white representatives to be more responsive than black representatives to different levels of district black population, since black constituents tend to distrust white representatives. Higher levels of project allocation are one way that white representatives might bridge this trust divide. The actual variable is measured by multiplying the observations of the district black population variable and the race of representative variable. Thus, for nonblack representatives, the variable is coded “0”; for black legislators, the variable is the district black population percentage.

congressional districts do. Bickers and Stein (1996) address this measurement problem in their study of congressional districts and federal projects. In those counties where congressional districts split counties, they assign the number of projects proportionally based on overall population of the portions of counties split. I do the same in this analysis. For example, assume a county is split between two congressional districts and receives three projects. District 1 contains one-third of the county’s population, and district 2 contains two-thirds of the population. Thus, the dependent variable for the county portion in district 1 will be “1”; the dependent variable for district 2 will be “2”. For those cases where the project allocations estimate for a county portion is not a whole number, I round to the nearest integer. Ideally, exact data would be available even to these county portions. Unfortunately, it is not, so I turn to the literature for a somewhat acceptable solution to this measurement problem. Also, just to be sure, I have estimated similar analyses as those presented later on just “whole” counties. The results are generally consistent. Fortunately, for all independent variables in the analysis, I was able to gather precise values for both whole counties and county portions and thus did not make similar estimations for split counties.¹⁶ Black voting age population was not available for a significant number of districts (any of those redistricted after the initial 1992 redistricting). Thus, I use black population.

Party of representative. Stein and Bickers (1994; 1995) find that the party of the representative has an impact on the allocation of projects. Also, I include this variable to test the fourth and final hypothesis. I expect that Republican legislators will allocate fewer projects to black constituents than will Democrats.

Other variables predicting project allocations. There are a number of other variables that are likely to predict project allocations. Most of these variables are based upon a legislator's status in the congressional hierarchy (e.g., seniority, whether on the Appropriations committee) and also based on demand for projects within the legislators' districts (e.g., percentage of constituency in agriculture). I include these additional variables in the analysis as well. However, since they are not central to the questions regarding racial representation, the descriptions and measures are included in the appendix.

Results: Racial Representation and Federal “Pork” Projects

The results from the analysis of counties is quite interesting. Holding all other variables at their means (see appendix), black representatives allocate more projects than their white colleagues do. However, the district's black population affects the allocation levels of projects for both black and white representatives in different ways. These findings lend support to arguments that descriptive representation matters, but so does the district black population. Table 2 details the results of the negative binomial regression analysis.

TABLE 2 HERE

Immediately, two results stand out. Two of the four variables of interest were significant—the race of the representative and the racial trust variable (the interaction of the legislator's race and district black population). The presence of a black representative had a positive and significant impact on allocations to black constituents at the 0.01 level. Interestingly, the racial trust variable is negative and significant at the 0.05 level. Given the potential multicollinearity between the race, district black population, and racial trust variables, we must be careful about conclusions related to just the district black population variable by itself (and its lack of significance). However, instead of dropping the racial trust variable as its inclusion is theoretically appropriate, the results of the analysis in table 2 suggest that

racial trust is an intervening variable and that the district black population, in isolation from other variables, has little impact of its own. Only when we consider the interaction of the presence of a black representative with the racial population of a district can we best understand the impact of racial representation on “pork” projects.¹⁷

A clearer interpretation of the impact of these variables is determined by computing the expected values of the number of federal project grants associated with each variable.¹⁸ The following formula, derived from the negative binomial distribution accomplishes this (see Long, 1997, 224, 237): $E(\text{projects} | x) = e^{(x\beta)}$. After calculating these expectations, it becomes clear that the presence of a black representative leads to more project allocations. *A county with a black representative will receive 22.5 more projects than a similar county represented by a white legislator.*

Figure 5 visually displays the expected values of the district black population while varying the race of the representative and the racial trust/interaction term for these counties that are at least 40 percent black (holding other independent variables at their means). Surprisingly, heavily black counties receive substantially greater numbers of projects when represented by black representatives *in districts with a white majority*. Black representatives in black-majority districts allocate significantly fewer projects than their black colleagues from other districts.

FIGURE 5 HERE

For white representatives, though, the black population of their districts appears to have little effect on the number of projects allocated to black constituents. Only one black-majority district during this time period, though, is represented by a white representative (Pennsylvania’s 1st district—two counties over three time periods). This district is 52 percent black in population. Also, districts during the 104th through 106th Congresses (1995-2000) represented by black representatives vary from 37 to 74 percent black. Thus, in the range of districts where black and white legislators overlap, *black*

¹⁷ Due to potential multicollinearity concerns, I also estimated this analysis separately for black legislators and nonblack legislators. The results displayed in Table 2 and Figure 5 were consistent with this split-sample analysis as well.

¹⁸ Note that for each sample, $p \leq 0.01$ for α . This indicates that overdispersion exists and the negative binomial specification was therefore more appropriate than the Poisson distribution.

representatives always allocate more projects than do white representatives. Thus, the results indicate that descriptive representation has a clear impact on project allocations to African-American constituents. Further, regardless of the black population of the district, white legislators allocate a static amount of projects to African-American constituents. However, black legislators clearly respond to differences in district black populations.

Black representatives are most likely to give substantial numbers of projects to black constituents in districts without black majorities. In figure 5, contrast the expected number of projects received when there is a black representative representing a 37 percent black district (37 percent is the district in the sample with the lowest black population, yet still represented by a black legislator) and when there is a black representative representing a majority-black district. In a 37 percent black district, a black representative allocates about 66 projects to counties with at least a 40 percent black population. A black legislator from a district with a 50 percent black population will allocate almost half that number, only approximately 30 projects.

In sum, these results demonstrate that racial representation affects the allocation of projects to black constituents. Black representatives allocate more projects than white representatives even when controlling for the district black population. Thus, a conclusion based on this evidence is that black legislators seem to view their role as being responsive to black constituents in general. Thus, any county in a black legislator's district with a significant black population (≥ 40 percent) is likely to receive a larger number of projects.

Other variables also have an impact on the number of projects allocated, and deserve a brief mention. As seen in Table 2, most of the demand control variables and a couple of the congressional control variables affect levels of allocation. The overall county population, the percent over age 65, and the presence of a state capital, for instance, all have sizable effects on the number of projects. The three congressional variables that are predictors of increased project allocations are the previous general election margin of the House representative, the presence of a Senator on the Appropriations committee, and the combined seniority of Senators.

Finally, it is important to note that party was not significant. While we must be cautious with conclusions based upon a negative finding, it does appear that race is a more important factor than party when it comes to the distribution of project allocations to black constituents. Surprisingly, both Democrats and Republicans seem to exhibit similar levels of project allocation to these counties. Thus, electing black legislators has an impact on larger project allocations to black constituents, while electing Democratic legislators does not.

The Importance of Electoral Coalitions in Understanding Racial Representation in Black Influence and Black-Majority Districts: Implications for a Post-*Georgia v. Ashcroft* Voting Rights Landscape

The results from this analysis are important for three reasons. First, to my knowledge, never before has a scholar undertaken an examination of the effect of racial representation on “pork” projects. Second, the findings suggest that descriptive representation affects the substantive representation of black constituents, rebutting some scholars’ claims. Third, the relationships between the black population of a district, the presence of a black representative, and policy outcomes are not always in the direction initially thought by most scholars. Given the Supreme Court’s endorsement of black influence districts in *Georgia v. Ashcroft*, these results are particularly important as a guide for the enforcement of the Voting Rights Act—and congressional debates over its possible extension—in the context of this court case.

Clearly, black representatives allocate more projects to black constituents. While enough data do not exist to test what would occur when white legislators represent majority-black constituencies, these results at least suggest that black representatives in the 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses allocated more projects to black constituents than did their white counterparts.

However, in isolation of constituency and electoral factors, this conclusion is too simplistic. To really understand the results, we have to consider the electoral coalitions of both white and black legislators, racial trust, the court-ordered redistricting that occurred in many southern states in the 1990s, and roll-call voting patterns of legislators.

All black legislators in this analysis are Democrats, and presumably, these legislators rely upon black voters in their districts as part of their “primary constituency.” Glaser (1996, Ch. 5) shows that in

majority-black districts, black legislators primarily need black votes to win general elections. Especially in supermajority black districts where the constituency is “packed” with black constituents, the need for white voter support is likely to be minimal for black representatives.¹⁹

Given the racial demography of these districts with a large percentage of black constituents, black legislators do not need a large turnout of black voters on Election day in order to secure reelection. In fact, as Swain (1995) has demonstrated, black legislators in non-competitive supermajority black districts have little incentive to work extensively in their districts. This finding clearly extends to “pork” project allocations. Further, it is likely that just on ideological grounds, black Democratic legislators in majority-black districts have “substantively represented” the interests of their primary black constituents and this may be sufficient to motivate a majority of their districts’ voters to the polls.

On the other hand, consider black representatives from black-minority constituencies. These representatives are divided into two categories: those with substantial populations of other minorities (usually Latino voters) and those with white majorities. Most of the black legislators representing constituencies without black majorities in the samples studied here fall into this latter category. Thanks to court-ordered redistricting in six southern states throughout the mid-1990s, black representatives initially elected in black-majority districts were forced to run again in substantially redrawn districts with reduced levels of black voters.

These representatives were initially elected in black-majority districts mostly with the support of black voters (see Voss and Lublin 2001 for evidence). These black representatives from districts without black majorities have more conservative voting records than black representatives from districts with large black populations. Having once represented majority-black districts with more liberal constituencies, redistricted black representatives now had to appeal to a biracial coalition (or in some cases a triracial or triethnic coalition) of voters. To do this, these black representatives from white-

¹⁹ Parker (1990) is the primary proponent of the need for supermajority black districts. He argues that districts of at least 65 percent black population are needed to enhance black representation. In fact, my findings add to a voluminous literature rebutting Parker’s claim (Grofman and Handley 1989; Grofman, Handley, and Niemi 1992; Lublin 1997; Swain 1995).

majority districts voted more conservatively than their counterparts from black-majority districts—and more conservatively than they had in previous congressional sessions (see Grose 2001 for evidence of this in terms of redistricting).

However, even with changed districts, these black legislators could not neglect black voters, their primary constituency (as well as a substantial minority of voters in these new districts). “Pork” projects are a perfect way to appeal to black constituents in the hopes of increasing black turnout. Partisan black voters who did not like the conservative tilt of some black representatives’ roll-call votes could find solace in the fact that these black representatives were delivering projects.

And these black legislators not only worried about spurring black turnout in general elections, but they also relied on their black voter base of support in primary elections. Even though these districts were redrawn to be majority-white, they were still Democratic districts. Most black incumbents faced with new districts in 1996 or 1998 faced white primary challengers. However, the racial dynamics of Democratic primaries are distinct from the dynamics of general elections where a much larger (and whiter) group of voters participate. By continuing to appeal to black voters through project distribution, black incumbents could work towards a primary victory against white Democratic opponents.

For example, Sanford Bishop, a black Democrat, was initially elected to Georgia’s 2nd district in 1992. At the time, the 2nd had a 57 percent black population. Although Bishop had a reputation as a moderate even then, he became decidedly more conservative once his district took on a whiter hue. In the 103rd Congress (1993-94), in a black-majority district, Bishop’s DW-NOMINATE score was -0.334 (with -1 being the most liberal possible score and +1 being the most conservative possible score).²⁰ For the 1996 elections, following the Supreme Court’s decision in *Miller v. Johnson*, his district was redrawn with a 39 percent black population. In the two Congresses after the district changed, the 105th Congress (1997-98) and the 106th Congress (1999-2000), Bishop’s DW-NOMINATE score was -0.270 and -0.238 respectively. These scores were much more conservative than the scores of his colleagues from districts

²⁰ Bishop’s DW-NOMINATE estimates are based on Poole and Rosenthal’s scaling of House members from the 1st through 108th Congresses. See <http://voteview.com> and Poole and Rosenthal (1997) for more information.

with black-majority constituencies for the same Congresses. Without question, Bishop altered his ideological voting as the district took on more white constituents and the median voter in his district changed.

Hobby Striping, Bishop's district director, indicated in an interview with me that Bishop often catches flak from black constituents for voting too conservatively. According to Striping, though, Bishop has a lot more leeway with black constituents thanks to the trust that exists based on shared racial background. He really had to work, especially initially in the redrawn majority-white district, with some whites who felt he was a little too liberal and voted with Democrats too much. The impression I received from talking with Striping is that if an issue divides white and black constituents, then Bishop likely may vote with white constituents or at least try to avoid taking a stance altogether, as the African-American population will cut Bishop more slack than will white voters. Striping said the typical response to a constituent who is unhappy with how Bishop voted on the bill is to say "After reviewing the bill entirely and looking at his *whole* district, he supports or opposes it." Most white constituents, on the other hand, do not have this trust and he really has to demonstrate on some issues that he is voting conservatively.

An example of this was the issue of the Georgia state flag. The flag of Georgia, until recently, prominently contained the confederate flag. Roy Barnes, the white former Democratic governor of the state, proposed changing (and eventually did change) Georgia's state flag. This was overwhelmingly favored by most African-American Georgians, and strongly opposed by many white Georgians, especially whites in the southern part of the state that Bishop represents. For Bishop, this issue was toxic as a substantial part of Bishop's reelection constituency could be offended by any position he took on the issue. As Striping detailed: "During the flag issue, there were some people who tried to bring him into it. He refused to be brought into it. He said, 'Whatever the state flag is, I'm going to fly it.'" He essentially sidestepped taking a stance by pointing out that this was an issue for the state legislature and governor, not a member of Congress. In a black-majority district, it is unlikely he would have taken this non-position, and instead may have supported a new flag. However, there was a concern that taking a position on the flag would lead to a loss in white voter support, even if black voters were angry at Bishop.

However, to secure victory in both the general and primary elections, Bishop still needed to retain and mobilize his voter base of black constituents. Thus, his representational strategy was not only about appealing to a numerical majority of white voters, but also keeping black voters in the fold and enthusiastic. In the 1996 Democratic primary in his new white-majority district, Bishop faced two white challengers, W.T. Gamble III and Walter Lewis. Bishop was able to get enough white voter support through his conservative voting record, but was also able to rely on nearly unanimous support from the black voters in his district (Bullock and Dunn 1999).

FIGURES 6 AND 7 HERE

One way that Bishop appealed to his black constituents was to increase the number of projects distributed to counties with large black populations.²¹ To provide evidence of this, it is useful to compare counties with the highest black population in Bishop's district with the counties in his district that received the most projects. Figure 6 shows two copies of the map of Bishop's district *prior to redistricting when his district had a black majority* (1993-96). In the map on the left, the ten counties (or portions of counties) with the largest black population are identified in bold. The district map on the right identifies which of these ten counties were *also* one of the top ten counties to receive the most projects in the district in the second year of the 104th Congress (1995-96), controlling for overall county population.²² Clearly, the counties with the greatest black population did not receive most of the projects when Bishop represented a black-majority district. Only two of the ten most heavily black counties, Stewart and Talbot (labeled in bold), were in the group of ten counties that received the most projects.

Contrast this map with Bishop's new, white-majority district drawn for the 105th Congress (1997-98). Figure 7 shows the pattern of project distribution in this reconfigured district. The maps here are the same as Figure 6 with the top ten black counties on the left and the counties that are in both the top ten black counties and the top ten project recipient counties on the right. The only difference is that the

²¹ Schiller (2000, Ch. 5) presents similar evidence of Senators attempting to use project delivery to appeal to various subsets of constituencies.

²² To control for overall population, an index of the ten counties with the highest number of projects divided by the overall population of the county was created.

projects data are for the final year of the 105th Congress (1997-98) *after the district was changed to become majority-white*. Here, with a much whiter constituency, five of the top ten project recipient counties were also in the group of heavily-black counties. With a more conservative voting record, Bishop needed to utilize the other perquisites of office to reach black voters. Stripling, Bishop's district director, indicated that they were much more concerned about reaching black voters once the district was reshaped to become white-majority: "We spent an awful lot of effort making sure we got the black vote out. We wanted, er, we were very, very aware that we needed to attract white voters, [but] we really made an effort to reach the black vote." One way Bishop was able to reach out to black voters was via project delivery.

As evidenced here, Bishop delivered fewer projects to heavily-black counties prior to the remap. But, following the general pattern seen in the aggregate analyses, once he took on a white-majority district and a more conservative voting record, he increased his project allocations to counties with large black populations. This example helps explain the results we see for black representatives. Electoral coalitions differ for black representatives from black-majority districts and those from white-majority districts. For white representatives, though, we see a slightly different outcome.

Implications for the Future of Majority-Minority Districts and the Voting Rights Act

Benson (2004) has argued that *Georgia v. Ashcroft* should be the impetus the voting rights community needs to push for stronger protections for majority-minority districts. The Court's finding in the case, though, suggests that black influence districts may be the preferred method of insuring black interests in the future—and that majority-minority districts are no longer needed. I suggest a third way. Supporting the Court's implied support of influence districts, I find black influence districts are clearly the best solution for increasing the delivery of federal projects to African-American constituents. However, supporting legal advocates of majority-minority districts and not supporting the Court's interpretation, I find that only black influence districts that can elect black representatives provide enhanced minority representation. Thus, if the choice is a black influence district likely to elect a white legislator versus a black-majority district likely to elect a black legislator, then the black-majority district

is more likely to enhance the interests of African-American voters. Black influence districts represented by black legislators, though, are more preferable than black-majority districts represented by black legislators. This finding supports Swain's (1995) argument that safe black-majority districts lead to legislators who were less focused on constitutional responsiveness. Black influence districts are only useful mechanisms for enhancing black substantive representation when they will almost certainly elect black legislators. Unfortunately, given racially polarized voting, black influence districts do not frequently elect black legislators in open seat elections.

Gerken (2005, 1189) notes that the legal debate over *Georgia v. Ashcroft* centers on "the tradeoff between 'influence' and 'control'." My findings suggest that African-Americans do not have influence over the distribution of project allocations when black influence districts are represented by white legislators. Thus, districting plans that lean more heavily on the "control" side of the coin may deserve the most protection when attempting to protect African-American representational strength.

So, in conclusion, what is the "best" districting arrangement for enhancing black interests in Congress? In terms of project allocation, an arrangement that allows for the election of the most black representatives in black influence districts or perhaps districts that are just barely black-majority seems to be the best. This way, black legislators can win in districts that are not overwhelmingly black, yet surrounding districts will not be diluted so substantially that white representatives can ignore black constituents or take them for granted. Further, given that the ideological preferences of Congress in the aggregate do not change substantially due to racial redistricting, policy-making activities such as project allocation should be examined when determining how the Voting Rights Act should best be enforced.

Much has been written, by both scholars and judges, about the "best" districting arrangement to enhance the substantive representation of black voters. The Supreme Court in *Georgia v. Ashcroft* argued that maximizing black-majority districts may be a detriment to the best aggregate representation of black interests in the legislature (see also Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997; Swain 1995; Whitby 1997). Others have pointed to other benefits besides roll-call voting inherent in descriptive

representation, though most of these have been theoretical arguments with little empirical evidence (Mansbridge 1999; Williams 1998).

The analysis presented here suggests a different view. The “best” districting arrangement would clearly be a districting plan that maximizes the election of black legislators from black influence districts, while leaving surrounding districts represented by white legislators with significant black populations as well. In the case of project allocations, black legislators (regardless of black population) allocated more projects than did white legislators. In black influence districts, however, black legislators allocated even greater numbers of projects to black constituents. Also, in Congress as a whole, I demonstrated that the median legislator’s position on civil rights did not change substantially under a variety of districting aggregation schemes. In the aggregate, then, maximizing black legislators while not “diluting” surrounding districts clearly seems to be the best policy prescription for the maximization of substantive representation. This policy prescription differs substantially from scholars who have simply suggested that black influence districts are preferable. By noting the need for descriptive representation, I am suggesting that black influence districts should only be drawn under very narrow conditions: those in which black legislators are very likely to win, and not those in which black candidates have an even chance of victory. The even chance of victory has typically been the standard offered by other advocates of black influence districts.

This policy suggestion may be easier said than done, however. The cases analyzed here of black legislators from districts without a black-majority are only very recent phenomena. It is not clear whether white voters with histories of racially polarized voting are ready to elect black legislators in open seat elections. The cases of black legislators representing white-majority districts studied here are almost entirely those who were forced to run in white-majority districts as incumbents once the courts ruled their districts unconstitutional. Would African-American members of Congress Mel Watt (D-NC), Corrine Brown (D-FL), or even Sanford Bishop (D-GA) have been able to win in their court-ordered white-majority districts had they not been incumbents? Staff that I spoke with who worked for black legislators as well as surrounding white legislators all unanimously concluded that it would have been unlikely.

When I asked Hobby Stripling, Sanford Bishop's district director, whether he thought Bishop would have won in his white-majority (39 percent black) district without having initially been elected in a black-majority district, he remarked as follows: "Without having the name recognition and providing the services, no. Quite frankly because he's black. I wish it weren't true."

Few black members of Congress have been elected in districts that are white-majority, and most that have were initially elected in districts with a black-majority. To examine the opportunity for African-American candidates to be elected in Congress, see Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 charts the number and percentage of African-American congressional incumbents who were elected in 2000. Thirty-six black incumbents ran for reelection, and all were successful. Five of these were elected in white-majority districts and eight were elected in districts with a black minority but a majority of African-American, Asian-American, and/or Latino constituents. Table 4 shows the number and percentage of successful African-American challengers who ran against nonblack incumbents or who ran in open seats. Based on 2000 figures, non-incumbent black candidates clearly did not fare well. Of 15 black candidates who ran in open seats or against incumbents, only one was victorious: Lacy Clay, running in an open seat in a black-majority district. The other candidates, some of whom included lower-level elected officials and some of whom included inexperienced candidates, all lost when running for open seats or against incumbents in districts that did not have a black-majority population. Thus, prospects for many more black members of Congress appear bleak given these trends.

TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE

Recently, however, some black legislators have succeeded in winning in white-majority settings. Julia Carson (D-IN), representing the Indianapolis-based 10th district of Indiana, won an open seat election in a district with a 30 percent black population. David Scott (D-GA) also won in a newly-created 47 percent black district in the 2002 open seat election in the 13th district of Georgia.²³ While clearly a

²³ This black district population figure is based on dividing the district population identifying only as black or African American in the 2000 census divided by the total population in the district based on the 2000 census.

boon for both descriptive and substantive representation of black constituents, these examples may be rare occurrences.

Thus, local conditions should be examined when determining whether black legislators can succeed in garnering some nonblack voter support. What is different between Indianapolis where Carson was able to win, than, say Cincinnati? Indiana's 10th district is a compact district taking in most of Indianapolis and some surrounding areas. Ohio's first district is also compact, taking in most of Cincinnati and some surrounding areas of Hamilton County. Nationally, both cities are considered conservative for urban areas, though Cincinnati is more Democratic than Indianapolis. The racial and ethnic demographics are virtually the same in each district. In both Indiana's 10th and Ohio's 1st, the black population is approximately 30 percent and the white population is approximately 70 percent. Both cities have rich African-American histories and heritages. Also, outlying areas of the cities are somewhat affluent and give the areas a Republican bent. Yet, the first district of Ohio is represented by white Republican Steve Chabot while black Democrat Julia Carson represents the Indiana tenth. Future researchers should in more detail examine the preconditions that may allow for black candidates to win in white-majority settings to determine what causes these differences in outcomes by candidates such as Carson and Chabot.

Therefore, other strategies in addition to increasing the number of black legislators from white-majority districts may need to be found. Since black legislators enhance black representation, districts that are almost 50 percent black or exactly 50 percent black may be needed. This seriously increases the likelihood of a black candidate victory (Lublin 1997), yet keeps the district competitive so that the legislator will reach out to his or her primary constituency. In these districts, black legislators should be able to mobilize African-American voters in primary elections so that a black candidate is able to win the primary. And if the district is just slightly black minority, then it is also likely that at least a handful of nonblack voters can be found to crossover and support the black Democrat in the general election.

Also, some have suggested only drawing districts that are capable of electing black legislators in areas that will not result in diluting Democratic voting strength in surrounding districts, such as the

northeast or urban areas in other parts of the country (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997). The rationale here is that electing black legislators from black-majority districts may help increase substantive representation, so long as surrounding districts are not left with large majorities of conservative white constituents. This idea has some merit, but is flawed when we consider legislative behavior beyond roll-call voting.

Black legislators in southern and other states are better at delivering federal projects to black constituents than are their white colleagues. White representatives, both Democrat and Republican, simply did not match the efforts from black legislators. Thus, even in southern states and other states with conservative white populations, if we are concerned about project delivery to African-American constituents, then it still may be useful to draw black-majority districts (resulting in greater substantive representation for black constituents "beyond the vote").

Another strategy that can lead to more black legislators from districts without a black-majority, and thus increase substantive representation, is to create more majority-minority districts with a black plurality. Black legislators can more easily win in districts that are black and Latino majority, though with only a black minority. Also, a district with Asian-American, black, and/or Latino voters together may be more likely to elect a black legislator, though the evidence on the extent that Asian-American voters would be likely to crossover and vote for a black candidate is limited.

While drawing majority-minority districts with black pluralities in order to elect black legislators may enhance the substantive representation of black interests, it is not clear what impact this will have on other racial and ethnic minorities. Brischetto (1998) asks the normatively worrisome question: "If one racial or ethnic group is larger than another in a given locale, do members of the smaller group become simply 'filler people' in forming the district in which the larger group predominates?" This is especially the case when Latino voter registration rates may be significantly lower than black voter registration rates. Thus, a black plurality district in terms of population may result in the election of a black legislator, providing enhanced substantive representation for African-Americans but perhaps not for Latino

constituents. This question of Latino substantive representation by non-Anglo, non-Latino representatives deserves further study.

In sum, this study speaks to the Supreme Court decision in *Georgia v. Ashcroft*. In this case, the Supreme Court suggested majority-black districts no longer need to be maximized in districting plans. I concur mildly with their opinion. Districting plans that maximize black voters' interests and black voting rights are those that maximize the election of black legislators in relatively competitive districts. Thus, depending on the local context, the policy to be adopted should include black influence districts only if black legislators can win. Otherwise, black-majority districts are critically needed.

Table 1: Incidence of Counties Represented by Black and Nonblack Representatives by Black Population of Congressional District, 104th-106th Congress

Counties that are at least 40 percent black in population*

<i>Black population of district (%)</i>	<i>Black</i>	<i>Nonblack[†]</i>	<i>Total</i>
0-20	0 counties	44	44
21-30	0	91	91
31-40	43	112	155
41-50	21	28	49
51-60	152	6	158
61-70	226	0	226
71-75	6	0	6
All	448	275	723

*These data are based on all congressional districts in the 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses (1995-2000). All districts with a county or counties that are 40 percent black or higher during this time period are included as the unit if analysis is counties \geq 40 percent black.

[†] Three of the counties represented by a nonblack legislator in this sample are represented by a Latino legislator (Jose Serrano; NY-16); the rest are white legislators.

Table 2: The Effect of Racial Representation on the Number of “Pork” Projects Allocated to U.S. Counties with at Least a 40 Percent Black Population, 1996, 1998, 2000[†]

Dependent variable: Number of new project grants allocated from all federal programs

<i>Independent variables:</i>	<i>Coefficient (standard error)</i>
<i>Racial representation variables:</i>	
Black population of district (%)	-0.001 (0.003)
Black representative	2.014 (0.736)***
Racial trust (Black population of district x race of member)	-0.032 (0.013)**
Party of representative	-0.307 (0.251)
<i>Congressional variables for those representing each county:</i>	
Member on House Appropriations committee	-0.039 (0.273)
Previous election margin of House representative	0.006 (0.003)**
Senator on Senate Appropriations Committee	0.489 (0.125)***
Seniority of House member	-0.004 (0.007)
Seniority of Senators (combined total)	-0.007 (0.001)***
<i>County-level project demand variables:</i>	
Median family income in county (in 1000s)	-0.03 (0.002)***
Overall population of county (in 1000s)	0.004 (0.0003)***
Proportion below poverty in county	-0.287 (0.069)***
Proportion blue collar workers in county	-0.242 (0.082)***
Proportion in farming occupations in county	-5.630 (0.326)***
Proportion over age 65 in county	11.386 (2.914)***
Proportion under age 18 in county	-0.065 (0.237)
Proportion urban in county	1.717 (0.018)***
Proportion with less than high school diploma in county	-1.665 (0.328)***
State capital located in county	1.376 (0.181)***
Constant	2.392 (0.625)***
α (alpha)	1.536 (0.378)***
N	729 counties/portions of counties

[†] This model is estimated using negative binomial regression and controlling for heteroscedasticity (using the “cluster” command in Stata, denoting each year of analysis). The sample is counties in all congressional districts in the 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses.

***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10

Table 3: Black Electoral Success in 2000 General Elections for Congress, Incumbents

	$\geq 50\%$ black districts	$< 50\%$ black, but majority-minority districts*	$\geq 50\%$ white**	Total districts with at least one black candidate
Successful incumbent black candidates	23	8	5	36 (100.0%)
Unsuccessful incumbent black candidates	0	0	0	0 (0.0%)
Total incumbent Black candidates	23 (46.0%)	8 (16.0%)	5 (10.0%)	36 (100.0%)

Racial population data of districts are from the 107th Congress edition of *Politics in America*.

* Majority-minority districts are those that have a combined black, Hispanic, and/or Asian population > 50 percent.

**non-Hispanic white.

Table 4: Black Electoral Success in 2000 General Elections, Challengers and Open Seats

	$\geq 50\%$ black districts	$< 50\%$ black, but majority-minority districts*	$\geq 50\%$ white**	Total districts with at least one black candidate
Successful non-incumbent black candidates	1	0	0	1 (7.1%)
Unsuccessful non-incumbent black candidates	0	1	13 [†]	14 (92.9%)
Total non-incumbent black candidates	1 (7.1%)	1 (7.1%)	13 (85.7%)	15 (100.0%)

Racial population data of districts are from the 107th Congress edition of *Politics in America*.

* Majority-minority districts are those that have a combined black, Hispanic, and/or Asian population > 50 percent.

**non-Hispanic white.


[†]Includes 2001 special open seat election between Louise Lucas and Randy Forbes.

Figure 1: 93rd Congress, Civil Rights Ideal Point Estimates, all members




Median House member on the civil rights issue dimension in 93rd Congress: Joseph Gaydos (D-PA20) at -0.035 on civil rights issue dimension (the median's location is statistically indistinguishable from point estimates of the median in 102^d, 103^d, and 104th)

Figure 2: 102^d Congress, Civil Rights Ideal Point Estimates, all members




Median House member on the civil rights issue dimension in 102^d Congress: Dave McCurdy (D-OK4) at -0.056 on civil rights issue dimension (the median's location is statistically indistinguishable from point estimates of the median in 93^d, 103^d, and 104th)

Figure 3: 103^d Congress, Civil Rights Ideal Point Estimates, all members




Median House member on the civil rights issue dimension in 103^d Congress:
Pete Peterson (D-LF2) at -0.085 on civil rights issue dimension (the median's location is statistically indistinguishable from the point estimates of the median in 93^d, 102^d, and 104th)

Figure 4: 104th Congress, Civil Rights Ideal Point Estimates, all members



Median House member on the civil rights issue dimension in 104th Congress:
Christopher Smith (R-NJ4) at 0.151 on civil rights issue dimension (the median's location is statistically indistinguishable from point estimates of the median in the 93^d, 102^d, and 103^d)

Figure 5: Expected Number of Projects Allocated to Counties That Are 40 Percent Black and Higher, Dependent Upon the Representative's Race and the District's Black Population (Holding Other Variables Constant at Their Means)



Figures 6 and 7 here—Bishop maps

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Appendix: Specification of other independent variables in pork project allocation model

Below I detail the other independent variables used in the negative binomial regression model shown in Table 2 and how they are measured:

Congressional variables. *Member on House Appropriations committee* is a variable included to control for the access to projects that legislators serving on this committee have (Arnold 1979; Ferejohn 1974). The expectation is that counties that are in districts represented by Appropriations committee members will receive more projects than counties without representation. The variable is coded “1” if the legislator representing the county is on the committee and is coded “0” if not.

Senator on Appropriations committee is a similar control variable. Lee (1998) shows that the Senate also plays a role in the distribution of projects. Here, too, the variable is coded “1” if a county is represented by a Senator who is on the Appropriations committee.²⁴

Seniority of House member. The number of years that a legislator has previously served in the House affects the allocation of projects and this seniority could work in two possible directions. More junior members may have less access to the allocation of projects given their lower status in the House. On the other hand, very senior members, in the protectionist stage of their careers, may feel safe and will not need to work as hard to secure projects for constituents. Therefore, we may expect seniority to either decrease or increase project allocations. This variable is measured as the number of years served by a House member at the opening of the Congress in which the project is allocated.

Seniority of Senators. The seniority of Senators can also affect the allocation of projects. This variable is the total number of years served by both Senators in a state.

Previous election margin of House member. Stein and Bickers (1994; 1995) find that the lower the electoral margin of a House incumbent, the more likely an incumbent will allocate a greater number of projects in the subsequent Congress. Those legislators that are the most electorally unsafe will need to use all advantages available to incumbents, and “pork” project delivery is one of these advantages. Thus, I expect that the general election margin received by a legislator in the previous election will affect the number of project allocations.

Demand-level variables. I also need to account for project demand by constituents. Distributive policy projects are sometimes allocated because of political concerns, but also are often distributed purely out of need or demand (Stein 1981; Rich 1989). After all, even when political influence is involved, a potential grant recipient must still apply for a grant. A representative’s influence is limited to the ability to advertise available grants to constituents and to work to procure specific grants once the grant has been applied for (see Ferejohn 1974 and Arnold 1979 for more details). Thus, well-specified models of project

²⁴ No Senators from the same state concurrently serve on the Appropriations committee in this sample, so a dichotomous variable is sufficient.

distribution need to consider that “some communities find project grants difficult to apply for and politically undesirable to accept” (Stein 1981).

The models presented involve U.S. counties. In order to determine which explanatory variables predict project allocations to counties, I turn to the literature on project distribution. This literature, though, has typically looked at only district or state level allocations. Because of this, the independent variables used are those found to affect project allocations at these higher levels of aggregation. In this analysis, they are applied to the county level.

The first and most obvious demand-level variable is the *overall population of the county*. Largely populated counties will receive more projects than those counties with few residents. Levitt and Snyder (1995), Stein (1981), and others have found that the overall population of a geographic area is one of the most important predictors of project allocations.

Other demand-level variables deal with the occupational backgrounds of constituents. Bickers and Potoski (2000) and Bickers and Stein (1996) find a negative relationship between the percentage of employees in agriculture and project allocations. Bickers and Potoski (2000), Bickers and Stein (1996), and Levitt and Snyder (1995) find that the higher the percentage employed in blue collar jobs, the less likely projects will be allocated. Thus, I include two independent variables to control for these factors. The *proportion in farming occupations* is the proportion of all employed people in each county who are classified as working in “farming, forestry, and fishing” occupations by the 1990 U.S. census. The *proportion of blue collar workers* is also calculated using census data: the proportion of all employed people in each category who are classified as working in one of four blue collar occupation categories.²⁵

Similarly, economic variables pertaining to the residents of geographic areas are important. Levitt and Snyder (1995) and Bickers and Potoski (2000) find that the median family income has a negative impact on project allocation. The rationale is that very wealthy communities are more likely to seek market-based assistance or simply do not need government projects as much as more middle and low income communities. Also, though, very poor communities may not have the skills or resources to seek projects (Stein 1981), so a variable capturing poverty in each county is also needed. The *median family income* variable is the median family income in each county from the 1990 U.S. census. The *proportion below poverty* is the number of persons in poverty in each county divided by the number of persons for whom poverty status is established (also from the 1990 U.S. census).

Other demand-level constituency characteristics affect project allocation. Control variables for younger residents, senior residents, urban residents, and less educated residents are needed. Following

²⁵ The four census occupational categories used to calculate the blue collar variable are the following: (1) machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors; (2) transportation and material moving occupations; (3) handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers; and (4) precision production, craft, and repair occupations.

Bickers and Potoski (2000) and Bickers and Stein (1996), I include the variables *proportion over age 65* and *proportion under age 18* in each county.²⁶ Large senior populations are more likely to receive projects than younger populated areas.

The *proportion urban* and the *proportion with less than a high school diploma* are included to control for demand and are both from the 1990 census. The urban variable is the number of persons living in urban areas divided by all persons in the county, while the education variable is the proportion of all persons under age 25 without a high school diploma living in each county. Urban residents are much more likely to receive projects (Bickers and Potoski 2000; Levitt and Snyder 1995). Less-educated populaces, on the other hand, are less likely to have the skills to apply for grants, and thus will not receive as many (Bickers and Stein 1996).

Finally, I also include a variable that designates whether a state capital is located in the county. Levitt and Snyder (1995) find this to be a significant predictor of project allocations. Given the way that the FAADS data are reported, many projects are allocated to the state government to distribute throughout the state. However, the actual coding in the FAADS database codes all of these projects as allocated to the county in which the state capital is located (Stein and Bickers 1995). Thus, I include a dummy variable indicating the presence of a state capital in a county as these counties will receive many more projects than others.

²⁶ Levitt and Snyder (1995) also find that the population over age 65 affects project allocation levels. The specific data for these variables is from the 1990 census as well.